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A Home with Dignity: Domestic Violence and
Property Rights
Margaret E. Johnson ∗
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that the legal system should do more to address
intimate partner violence and each party’s need for a home for several
reasons. First, domestic violence is a leading cause of individual and
family homelessness. Second, the struggle over rights to a shared home
can increase the violence to which the woman is subjected. And third, a
woman who decides to continue to live with the person who abused her
receives little or no legal support, despite the evidence that this decision
could most effectively reduce the violence. The legal system’s current
failings result from its limited goals—achieving a narrow concept of
short-term safety premised on physical separation in the home. This
Article argues for creating a comprehensive theory that addresses the
rights to a home when there is domestic violence by focusing on each
party’s dignity, the importance of home and ending domestic violence,
as opposed to merely “safety.”
There are several laws that address the home when there is domestic
violence. The civil protection order (CPO) laws are the most prevalent;
they exist in all fifty states and Washington, D.C. While most offer a
vacate remedy to exclude the perpetrator of abuse from the shared home,
they do so with varying effectiveness and petitioner success rates. Also,
very few provide any economic support to maintain the home or find a
new home if respondent is not excluded. And all 51 jurisdictions
provide very few options to support a woman’s choice to stay in the
shared home with her abuser, despite her decision that it would best end
the domestic violence.
* Associate Professor and Co-Director, Center on Applied Feminism, University of Baltimore
School of Law. I am indebted to the feedback and comments from Professors Matt Fraidin,
Deborah Epstein, Robin West, Carolyn Grose, Rachel Camp, Lisa Shabel, Kate Kruse, Jessica
Miles, Jill Engle, Audrey McFarlane, Leigh Goodmark, Dionne Koller, and Michele Gilman. I
was assisted by amazing research assistants Lana Castor, Ashley Wagner, Sarah Witri, Amy
Lazas, Megan Morrisette. I also want to thank the Georgetown Law Library, The University of
Baltimore Summer Research Fellowship, and the extremely helpful editors of the Brigham
Young University Law Review.
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Beyond these shortcomings, the CPO vacate provisions also clash
with property law in problematic ways for the respondents. Thirty-four
jurisdictions permit vacating a perpetrator from his home, despite being
the sole owner of the property. And there is a trend of making these oncetemporary vacate orders permanent. This clash can make the legal
system seem unfair to perpetrators, which can lower their rate of
compliance with the CPO. As a result, perpetrators may increase their
violence against women subjected to abuse.
This Article proposes a renewed anti-domestic violence movement
that is focused on the dignity of and greater home access for both parties.
Such a movement could focus on expanding existing laws that would
both promote dignity and end domestic violence while ensuring greater
home access. For instance, one proposal is for more thorough court fact
finding in making the vacate order that includes the abuse as well as
each party’s risk of potential homelessness and the extent of their
personhood interests in the home. Another proposal is to increase the
number of home options for the parties by creating shelters for men who
are abusive, more jurisdictions that require alternative housing through
a CPO, and increased funding for low-barrier battered women shelters
and transitional housing.
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Judge Bruce S. Lamdin ordered Gordan Bisnath not to abuse,
threaten or harass [Parbadee Ann Bisnath, Mr. Bisnath’s ex-wife with
whom he still shared a home]. . . . [Judge Lamdin] directed the 48-year-old
to complete an abuser intervention program. But when it came time to
address the victim’s request that her abuser not be permitted to contact her
or return to their home . . . the judge declined. “Where is he going to live?”
Lamdin asked . . . . 1
“He’s making the home unsafe for her, so he’s the one who should have
consequences. . . . That she and the children should be homeless because he’s
breaking the law makes no sense.”2
“When it comes down to a protective order, [w]ho owns the property has
little or nothing to do with anything.”3
INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I examine intimate partner violence and
determine that the legal system does not appropriately address all of
the issues that are critical to supporting each party’s need for a
home. 4 As a result of this problem, and as demonstrated by the
Bisnath case set forth above, domestic violence can increase, and the
1. Jennifer McMenamin, Judge’s action question again: After serving suspension for
conduct, Balto. Co. jurist criticized for failing to issue routine protective order in domestic violence
case, BALTIMORE SUN (October 22, 2008), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2008-1022/news/0810210094_1_domestic-violence-judge-lamdin.
2. Id.
3. A comment posted on the Baltimore Sun’s webpage in response to the Bisnath
story. George-WNEC, Comment to Anyone Want to TRY to Defend Judge Lamdin?, THE
BALTIMORE
SUN
TALK
FORUM
(Oct.
23,
2008,
8:04
AM),
http://talk.baltimoresun.com/showthread.php?t=168277.
4. I will discuss abuse by men against women throughout this article even though
there is clear evidence that women can abuse men and that abuse occurs in same-sex
relationships as well. I have made this choice because I am focused on the most prevalent form
of domestic violence, coercive controlling terrorism by a male intimate partner on a female,
which involves the operation of power and control through the use of various forms of abuse.
Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner
Violence: Research Update and Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476, 481–82
(2008). I also make this decision based on the research that shows women subjected to maleperpetrated domestic violence are by far the largest majority of domestic violence victims. See
id.; Domestic Violence Facts, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet%28National%29.pdf
(indicating
that 85% of persons subjected to abuse are women). See also Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining
Harm, Reimagining Remedies and Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1107, 1110 n.4 (2009). I make this decision with concern of perpetuating stereotypes based
on gender or domestic violence. See generally Leigh Goodmark, Transgender People, Intimate
Partner Abuse and the Legal System, 48 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 51 (2013).
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parties can become homeless. Our legal system does not do what it
can to support and maintain each person’s dignity. This problem
results from the legal system’s limited goals—achieving a narrow
concept of safety premised on physical separation in the home. This
Article argues for creating a comprehensive theory that addresses the
rights to a home when there is domestic violence by focusing on
each party’s dignity, the importance of home, and ending domestic
violence, as opposed to “safety.” To explore this new theory, this
Article discusses three scenarios that a woman subjected to abuse
might choose when she shares the home with her partner who has
abused her. First, she might choose to separate from her partner by
excluding him from the shared home while she stays in it. Second,
she might choose to separate from him by leaving the shared home
and allow him to stay in it. Third, she might choose not to separate,
but rather to continue the relationship and stay in the shared home.
Currently, the laws addressing the home when there is domestic
violence do not adequately address the following questions: What
goals should govern disputes relating to a shared home, or the
provision of a new home, when there is domestic violence? How
should the courts decide who should stay in the shared home? What
conditions should govern that party’s period of possession and the
other party’s exclusion? How can the domestic violence system
reconcile its laws with property law? If not permitted to stay or not
interested in staying in the shared home, can there be another home
for one of the parties? What conditions should govern the
identification, relocation, and maintenance of the new home? How
can the domestic violence movement work toward greater access to
the creation of a system where there are homes without
domestic violence?
There are several laws that address rights to the home shared by a
couple when there is domestic violence in the relationship. The civil
protection order (CPO) laws are the most prevalent laws addressing
domestic violence; they exist in all fifty states and Washington, D.C. 5
Although these laws vary, they are generally short-term solutions,
and focus primarily on injunctive relief designed to address violent
crimes committed by a person in particular forms of relationship with
another. 6 The available relief often includes a provision that enjoins
5. See infra Part II.B.1.
6. Id.
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future violence by the abuser, the respondent in the action; an order
for respondent to stay away from the person subjected to abuse, the
petitioner in the action; and an order that the respondent not
contact the petitioner. 7 Other relief may include counseling, child
custody, child support, and excluding respondent from the shared
home, often called a “vacate” order. 8
CPO vacate provisions vary greatly. For those subjected to abuse,
CPO laws could do more to ensure they have a home and all the
benefits that come from having a home. For instance, only some
states provide remedies that support the petitioner in maintaining
her home or obtaining a new home, such as ordering respondent to
contribute to rent, mortgage, and/or household expenses or to
provide an alternative home. 9 Such provisions are not available in
every jurisdiction, and their remedies are not very comprehensive. In
addition, the 51 jurisdictions provide very few options to support a
woman’s choice to stay in the shared home with her abuser, despite
her decision that it would best end the domestic violence. 10 But
research shows that when courts permit women to exert their
agency, they are best able to address the domestic violence. 11
At the same time, the CPO vacate provisions clash with property
law in problematic ways for the respondents. Thirty-four jurisdictions
permit respondents to be vacated from their home, despite being the
sole owners of the property. 12 And there is a trend of making these
once-temporary vacate orders permanent, as seen currently in New
Jersey. 13 This clash can make the legal system seem unfair to
respondents, which can lower their rate of compliance with the
CPO. As a result, respondents may increase their violence
against petitioners. 14
7. See generally Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 910–
1030 (1993).
8. Id.
9. See infra Part II.B.3.
10. See infra Part II.D.
11. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1148 (citing Angela Moe Wan, Battered Women in the
Restraining Order Process: Observations in a Court Advocacy Program, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 606, 615 (2000)).
12. See infra Part II.B.3.
13. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2529 (2012).
14. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic
Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1846 (2002).
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The issue of the home in domestic violence law needs greater
attention for several reasons. First, domestic violence is a leading
cause of individual and family homelessness. 15 Second, the struggle
over rights to a shared home can increase the violence to which the
woman is subjected. 16 And third, a woman who decides to continue
to share a home with the person who abused her receives little or no
legal support, despite the evidence that this decision could most
effectively reduce the violence. 17
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I will analyze the goals
that should guide our legal system when there is domestic violence
and the parties share a home: ending domestic violence, supporting
each party’s dignity, and affirming the importance of the home. Part
II analyzes the current legal landscape of laws that governs the home
when domestic violence occurs and examines its benefits and
shortcomings. Part III presents a proposed way forward: expanding
domestic violence advocates’ focus to include dignity as an advocacy
strategy for new or expanded laws identifying or creating homes for
persons experiencing or perpetrating domestic violence.
I. THE GOALS OF ENDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SUPPORTING
DIGNITY, AND AFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF HOME
As stated above, the legal system has limited goals in addressing
domestic violence, namely achieving short-term safety through
physical separation, including separation of the parties who might
share a home. This vision of safety has resulted in laws and funding
streams that do not always promote the safety of women subjected
to domestic violence and do not always address the other important
goals of ending domestic violence, supporting the dignity of
individuals and utilizing the home to achieve both the cessation of
domestic violence and supporting individuals’ dignity.
A. Ending Domestic Violence
The first goal for the legal system addressing the shared home
when there is domestic violence should be to end domestic violence.
Domestic violence continues to be a large social problem despite our

15. See infra Part I.C.1.
16. See infra Part II.B.3.
17. See infra Part II.D.3.
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expansive legal systems’ attempts to curb it. The National Coalition
Against Domestic Violence reports that one in every four women
will experience domestic violence in her lifetime. 18 An estimated 1.3
million women are victims of physical assault by an intimate partner
each year. 19 The exercise of power and control is central to domestic
violence. 20 That power and control may be exercised in many ways,
including physical violence, emotional abuse, or isolation. 21
Researchers have identified that effective responses to domestic
violence include those that support or restore a victim’s right to
“freedom, choice and autonomy.” 22 When women can choose and
control the options of how to address the domestic violence,
women’s agency is promoted and this promotion can help decrease
the risk of re-assault. 23 Therefore, legal interventions like the CPO
laws, which permit persons subjected to abuse to control their legal
remedy by choosing how best to address the abuse, can have a
positive impact on reducing domestic violence. 24 Similarly, the ability
to stay at a domestic violence shelter can positively affect women’s
psychological health as well as decrease violence. 25
Recently, the domestic violence justice system has focused less on
the agency of women subjected to abuse and generating multiple

18. NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 4.
19. Costs of Intimate Partner Violence Against Women in the United States, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL
(March 2003), http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv_cost/IPVBook-Final-Feb18.pdf.
20. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1126 (citing Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy:
Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles in Tort Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR.
L. REV. 945, 958 (2004); Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate
Partner Violence: Toward a New Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743 (2005)).
21. Id. at 1115–24.
22. Id. at 1151 (citing Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on
Domestic Violence Victims: How Much Is Too Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 30
(2007)).
23. Id.
24. Janice Grau et al., Restraining Orders for Battered Women: Issues of Access and
Efficacy, 4 WOMEN & POL. 13, 19, 21–25 (1984); Julia Henderson Gist et al., Protection
Orders and Assault Charges: Do Justice Interventions Reduce Violence Against Women?, 15 AM.
J. FAM. L. 59, 67 (2001); Johnson, supra note 4, at 1128; Carol E. Jordan, Intimate Partner
Violence and the Justice System, 19 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1412, 1425 (2004); Judith
McFarlane et al., Protection Orders and Intimate Partner Violence: An 18 Month Study of 150
Black, Hispanic and White Women, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 613, 617 (2000). But see Jordan,
supra note 4, at 1425.
25. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 104–
07 (Nancy A. Crowell & Ann Wolbert Burgess eds., 1996) (discussing Tutty study of shelters).
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options for them to address domestic violence and more on options
increasing the criminal justice system responses to domestic violence
focused on the state’s conception of women’s safety. 26 The legal
system has focused on supporting a person once subjected to abuse
after the person is in a non-abusive relationship or has left that
relationship, but only for a limited time. As scholars have noted,
there is “[v]irtually no attention . . . paid to a survivor’s need to
develop a support network beyond that available from short-term,
system-based advocacy.” 27 While separation of the two parties has
been the main focus of achieving safety in the short-term—through
mandatory arrests, no drop prosecutions, stay away and no vacate
orders in civil protection orders, and the funding of shelters—the
long-term approach to ending domestic violence and maintaining
the end of domestic violence is less developed.
Moreover, the separation-as-safety focus has resulted in the
isolation of women. Women subjected to abuse who move to
shelters or alternative homes in an effort to be physically separated
from their abusive partners end up separated from their
communities, support networks, neighborhoods, employment, and
children’s schools. Few system provisions exist to support the woman
who wishes to maintain her connection to her community. 28 And
connection to community is “vital to virtually all victims’ physical
safety . . . and psychological recovery.” 29 Accordingly, ending
domestic violence in the long term, not just the short term, should
be a goal of the legal system.
B. Supporting Dignity
In addition to ending domestic violence, the legal system should
uphold the dignity of the two parties in an abusive relationship who
share a home. Here, I borrow the definition of “dignity” used in
philosophy, political philosophy, and constitutional law. Dignity is
26. LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM 106–35 (2012); Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of
Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 305–06
(2011).
27. LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A
SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH AND JUSTICE 104
(2008).
28. Id. at 99.
29. Id.
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the inherent nature that renders human beings capable of
autonomous action and thought. 30 Dignity recognizes human beings
as separate from the state in determining fundamental questions
affecting the meaning of their lives. John Stuart Mill explained that
dignity exists in human beings simply because they have the capacity
to “explore the unknown and to share their discoveries.” 31 Similar to
the Millian conception is the United Nations Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and its preamble, which provide a “recognition of
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family. . . .” 32 In U.S. constitutional law, the
Supreme Court often discusses human dignity as related to personal
autonomy or “the inviolability of persons from intrusions by the
state.” 33 The concept of human dignity often is equated with each
individual’s inherent worth. 34 And the Court often discusses dignity
as essential to equality. 35 In American political culture, as Ronald
Dworkin explains, there “is a belief in individual human dignity: that
people have the moral right—and the moral responsibility—to
confront for themselves, answering to their own conscience and
conviction, the most fundamental questions touching the meaning
and value of their own lives.” 36
For human dignity, individuals must have both the opportunity
and capacity to make these personal, fundamental decisions, but
dignity is not contingent on whether individuals access the
opportunity or how they exercise this capacity. 37 Martha Nussbaum

30. Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity and Safety: The Impact of Domestic
Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 545 (2010).
31. RONALD BONTEKOE, THE NATURE OF DIGNITY 31 (2008) (comparing the Millian
view of dignity to the Kantian which posits that dignity exists in human beings because they
have the capacity to recognize and act upon objective and ethical truths).
32. Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 10, 12 (Michael J. Meyer & William A.
Parent eds., 1992).
33. Judith Resnick & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1937 (2003).
34. Johnson, supra note 30, at 546 (citing Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity
in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 215–18 (2008)).
35. Id. at 547; Neomi Rao, Gender, Race, and Individual Dignity: Evaluating Justice
Ginsburg’s Equality Jurisprudence, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1053, 1059, 1080 (2009).
36. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 426 (1992).
37. Johnson, supra note 30, at 546–47 (citing Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of
Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 215–18 (2008)).
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argues that we should ground dignity, and measure our political and
societal respect for it, not only in support of rationality but also of
such capabilities as life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses,
imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation;
respect for other species; play; and control over one’s environment. 38
In considering how dignity relates to intimate partner violence
almost all of these areas of capabilities emerge.
As discussed earlier, the legal system has robustly addressed ways
for a woman subjected to abuse to separate from her abuser when
they share a home. And these laws are critical both for women who
want to leave the relationship but stay in the home, and for women
who want to leave the relationship and the home. They address areas
of capabilities such as bodily health and integrity, emotions, practical
reason, affiliation and control over one’s environment. But they are
not comprehensive enough in addressing these capabilities. There are
virtually no laws that support a decision to stay in the relationship
and the home but end the violence. And the legal system has not
properly addressed the dignity of persons who abuse their intimate
partners, despite evidence that such consideration could decrease the
violence. This paper argues for dignity to be a guiding value for a
more comprehensive legal system that addresses the home in
domestic violence situations.
C. Affirming the Importance of Home
The third goal for the domestic violence legal system is affirming
the importance of “home” because of its relationship to domestic
violence. In addition, both property scholarship and domestic
violence scholarship show the importance of home to a
person’s dignity. 39
1. Home and domestic violence
There is a tight relationship between home and domestic
violence. The common law castle doctrine states that “in his home, a

38. Martha Nussbaum, Human Dignity and Political Entitlements, in HUMAN DIGNITY
BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS
(2008).
39. See, e.g., Lorna Fox, Re-Possessing “Home”: A Re-Analysis of Gender, Homeownership
and Debtor Default for Feminist Legal Theory, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423, 428
(2008).
AND
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man may forcefully defend himself, his family, and his property
against harm by others.” 40 This doctrine permitted self-governance
of the home separate from the state. Related to this doctrine, the
home, historically, was “the castle” where the male head of
household could govern the inhabitants as he saw fit. 41 As a result, if
the head of the household inflicted physical or other forms of abuse
in the home on his wife or children, the state was unable or
unwilling to step in and enforce criminal laws. 42 For many years,
there was a sense that the home is, or should be, an inviolable place
even if violence was being perpetrated by one family member
against another. 43
Recognizing that domestic violence often occurs inside the
family home and that women subjected to abuse should have the
option to have a violence-free home, the early Battered Women’s
Movement attempted to provide emergency, temporary homes by
creating a network of private shelters. 44 In addition, mandatory
criminal laws of arrest and prosecution were created, which gave the
state mandates to interfere in the home and separate the abuser from
the woman subjected to abuse through jailing or criminal stay away
40. JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 56 (2009) (explaining that in property and criminal
law, the “castle doctrine” has long regulated permissible behavior in response to home
intrusion).
41. Id.; Fox, supra note 39, at 427.
42. Fox, supra note 39, at 437; Epstein, supra note 14, at 1850–51.
43. Such a sense was reinforced by Lawrence v. Texas, where the Supreme Court found
criminal sodomy laws unconstitutional because people have a liberty interest in developing
intimate relationships in the privacy of their home. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
See also SUK, supra note 40, at 128–131. For further discussion of Lawrence and its support for
dignity, see Johnson, supra note 30, at 550. At the same time, there are exceptions in property
law to this view that the home is a castle and thus off-limits from the state. For instance, in a
case that does not involve domestic violence but rather eminent domain, Kelo v. City of New
London, the Supreme Court ruled that New London could properly take the plaintiffs’ homes
through the powers of eminent domain because repurposing them for other private ownership
that would create economic development and generate tax revenue was a “public use.” Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005). For a discussion of Kelo and its discussion of
home, see SUK, supra note 40, at 89–96.
44. See generally SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS
AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT (1982). In Washington, D.C., a
shelter stay typically lasts for twenty to thirty days. See SUPERIOR CT. OF THE DIST. OF
COLUM.,
CRIME
VICTIMS
COMPENSATION
PROGRAM,
available
at
http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/documents/CVCP_Brochure.pdf. This information is
also based on my students’ clinical experiences in representing clients seeking civil protection
orders and crisis shelter.
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orders. 45 And the Battered Women’s Movement created civil
protection order laws that permitted persons subjected to abuse to
temporarily vacate the abuser from the shared home. 46 All of these
interventions had the goal of immediate separation in the crisis and,
through separation, a short-term reduction in the violence.
Despite these vacate laws and this network of shelters, there is a
strong connection between domestic violence and homelessness. The
National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty reports that
domestic violence is a leading cause of homelessness nationally. 47
One study in Massachusetts found that 92% of homeless women
were survivors of physical or sexual assault at some point in their
lives. 48 These statistics help us understand that short-term, crisis
solutions for staying in the home or establishing a new home need to
be matched with long-term solutions to help maintain the home and
an abuse-free life. In addition, the short-term solutions also need to
expand in quantity and flexibility to accommodate more persons
subjected to abuse.
2. Dignity, home and property
There is a strong connection between home and dignity. The
connection begins with the historical relationship between dignity
and property as seen in the legal institutions of slavery and coverture.
Society’s lack of respect for the dignity of African Americans was
demonstrated by the enacted slavery laws, transforming human
beings into property until passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. 49

45. GOODMARK supra note 26, at 107–13; G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided:
Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s
Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 278–82 (2005) (analyzing mandatory interventions in the
domestic violence legal system).
46. PETER FINN & SARA COLSON, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION,
CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT (March 1990); See infra Part II.
47. Program: Domestic Violence, NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY,
http://www.nlchp.org/program.cfm?prog=3 (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
48. Id.
49. See Pamela D. Bridgewater, Un/re/dis Covering Slave Breeding in Thirteenth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 7 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 11, 13 (2001)
(analyzing slave breeding); Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner’s Truth: Race, Gender, and the
Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 313 (1996) (“The archetypes of the
slave . . . were ideologies of womanhood that functioned not to simply describe reality, but to
represent social relations in a way that legitimated and normalized racial and sexual
domination.”).
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Similarly, society’s lack of respect for married women’s dignity was
demonstrated with the institution of coverture. 50 Prior to the midnineteenth century, 51 although married women could hold title to
the property, coverture dictated that only their husbands could
exercise ownership rights, like the right to transfer, over the home. 52
If the property was jointly owned by the spouses as tenants by the
entirety, the husband exclusively controlled the property. 53 It took
the passage of the Married Women’s Property Acts and the
enforcement of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause to change these formal strictures on the
relationship of women and property. 54
Even with these changes, dignity, property, and home are still
interconnected. 55 This interconnectedness exists in laws that
distribute property based on the family unit or children, rather than
individuals. For example, following a divorce, use and possession of
the home is based in large part on the presence of children, and their
need to maintain their community, not on the parents’ needs. 56 This

50. Felice Batlan, Engendering Legal History, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 823, 830
(2005); Ellen Dannin, Marriage and Law Reform: Lessons from the Nineteenth-Century
Michigan Married Women’s Property Acts, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (2010) (“By depriving
women of the capacity to manage their property by the simple act of marriage, coverture
deprived women of the status, livelihood, self-protection, and self-respect linked to propertyholding.”); Gwen Hoerr Jordan, Agents of (Incremental) Change: From Myra Bradwell to
Hillary Clinton, 9 NEV. L.J. 580, 584, 590 (2009) (discussing how coverture rendered a
married woman “civilly dead” and how it was similar to slavery).
th
51. See Dannin, supra note 50, at 3 (explaining how before the 19 century, a woman
“lost control and, effectively, ownership of her personal and real property to a husband”);
Jordan, supra note 50, at 590 (discussing how married women had no right to real or personal
th
property pre-19 century).
52. Batlan, supra note 50, at 830; Dannin, supra note 50, at 4 (“Title to land remained
in the wife, but the husband was entitled to manage or rent her land during the marriage and
could retain any profits.”); Fox, supra note 39, at 429–30.
53. Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1294 (Haw. 1977); Johnson v. Leavitt, 125 S.E.
490, 491 (N.C. 1924).
54. Id.; See also Dannin, supra note 50, at 5–7.
55. See generally Audrey McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation,
Racialized Geography, and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855 (2011).
56. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-206(1) (“[T]o enable any child of the
family to continue to live in the environment and community that are familiar to the
child . . . .”). See also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-208(b)(1) (stating that the best interest
of the child will be a factor in the determination); Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 410 A.2d
1052, 1058 (Md. 1980) (explaining that the court’s interests is to “ensure that when a
marriage is dissolved, the interests of minor children in the family are given ‘particular and
favorable attention’”); Laczkowski v. Laczkowski, 496 A.2d 56, 62 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1985)
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lack of recognition of the parents’ independent basis from their
children for dignity echoes scholar Lorna Fox’s conception that the
individual woman often becomes invisible as a home owner or
occupier even while the family is highly visible. 57
While society has used property and home to devalue an
individual’s dignity, people have used their homes to support and
foster their dignity. Scholar bell hooks argues that for women of
color, the home serves as a situs for individual resistance and dignity.
bell hooks shows that for black women, and disadvantaged people
more generally, the home has provided a respite from outside
societal pressure and racism and also a situs for personal
development. 58 Historically, black women established their homes in
resistance to white supremacy and domination. 59 This is because
“[a]n effective means of white subjugation of black people globally
has been the perpetual construction of economic and social
structures that deprive many folks of the means to make
homeplace.” 60 Specifically, hooks states that “[b]lack women resisted
by making homes where all black people could strive to be subjects,
not objects, where we could be affirmed in our minds and hearts
despite poverty, hardship, and deprivation, where we could restore to
ourselves the dignity denied us on the outside in the public world.” 61
hooks also argues that “houses belonged to women, were their
special domain, not as property, but as places where all that truly
mattered in life took place—the warmth and comfort of shelter, the
feeding of our bodies, the nurturing of our souls. There we learned
dignity, integrity of being; there we learned to have faith.” 62 As seen
in bell hooks’ work, persons who are subjected to subordination
outside of home find a place of freedom and dignity inside
the home.
Similarly, Professor Margaret J. Radin’s personhood theory
argues that female home ownership can come not from the financial

(Divorce cases should yield to the “common law doctrine of parens patriae, the goal of which
is to provide the child with a permanent home”).
57. Fox, supra note 39, at 440, 452–53.
58. Id. at 445, 447 (citing bell hooks, YEARNING: RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL
POLITICS 42 (1990)).
59. BELL HOOKS, YEARNING: RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL POLITICS 44 (1990).
60. Id. at 46.
61. Id. at 42.
62. Id. at 41–42.
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connection or the family relationships but from the occupier’s
individual attachment to and relationship with the property. 63 As
Radin states, the home “is the scene of one’s history and future,
one’s life and growth. In other words, one embodies or constitutes
oneself there. The home is affirmatively part of oneself—property for
personhood—and not just the agreed-on locale for protection from
outside interference.” 64 Property rights that are related to
personhood, Radin argues, should take precedence over property
rights that are not personal. 65 Accordingly, Radin argues that there
should be a prima facie case that the right to personhood property
should be protected against the government or fungible, nonpersonal property claims. 66 And if without this prima facie case, “the
claimants’ opportunities to become fully developed persons in the
context of our society would be destroyed or significantly lessened,”
the case would be strongest. 67 Radin’s personhood theory supports
legal recognition of the connection between property and dignity.
D. Ending Domestic Violence, Supporting Dignity, and Affirming the
Importance of Home
The connection between the three goals of ending domestic
violence, supporting dignity, and affirming the importance of home
is underscored by a recent study of low-income Puerto Rican women
subjected to abuse. In this study, the young women often entered
intimate partner relationships not out of love but for an immediate
need for housing as they left their abusive childhood homes. 68 But
when those intimate relationships became abusive, “[h]ousing . . .
became a valued resource and source of power when [they] wanted
out of their abusive intimate relationships and into housing they
controlled.” 69 The women “transposed their housing dependencies
from intimate partners to housing they control.” 70 The study showed
that these women found a source of power in their independent
63. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 992 (1982).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1013.
66. Id. at 1014–15.
67. Id.
68. Sherri Lawson Clark, et al., Housing Dependence and Intimate Relationships in the
Lives of Low-Income Puerto Rican Mothers, 32 J. FAM. ISSUES 369 (2010).
69. Id. at 382.
70. Id. at 385.
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housing and that, even when the home was shared with an intimate
partner, the women maintained their control over the home by
making their partners live in the shadows and not join in the lease. 71
The study also showed that “[m]others . . . interpreted housing as a
valued resource in intimate partner relationships in divergent ways
with independent housing being seen as a bargaining tool to
maintain or initiate relationships as well as a refuge for terminating
relationships that experienced conflict.” 72 As the study found,
“[h]aving control over housing made it easier for [the women] to
endure tenuous relationships.” 73 As can be seen in the study of
Puerto Rican low-income women, the home is a determinative factor
in ending violence. Women subjected to abuse may choose to
control the relationship, or rearrange it in a way that the women
maintain control and decrease their exposure to violence, by either
living apart from the abuser or residing with him. And one’s home is
a determinative factor in this rearrangement.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL SYSTEM
As the above discussion demonstrates, the goals of ending
domestic violence, supporting each party’s dignity, and affirming the
importance of home are critical for a legal system to properly address
domestic violence when the parties live together. This Part will
address the many laws that govern the use, possession, exclusion of
and responsibility for the home when there is domestic violence.
While some of the laws fit these goals, many of them do not and
need reform.
A. Three Categories of Laws
I divide the laws that address the home when there is domestic
violence into three categories: (1) those that permit the person
subjected to abuse to stay in the shared home and exclude the
abuser; (2) those that permit the person subjected to abuse to leave
the shared home and obtain a new home; and (3) those that permit
the person subjected to abuse to stay in the shared home with their
partner but ending the domestic violence.

71. Id. at 388.
72. Id. at 385.
73. Id. at 386.
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First, there are several laws that permit a person subjected to
abuse to stay in the shared home and exclude the abuser: (1) civil
protective order (CPO) laws that permit a petitioner, the person
subjected to abuse, to obtain an order that excludes the respondent,
the person abusing the other, from the home; (2) rental laws that
permit a person subjected to abuse to defend against eviction and
bifurcate the leasehold when the landlord seeks to evict the co-tenant
abuser and the co-tenant victim for the violence committed; and (3)
rental laws that permit a person subjected to abuse to require their
landlord to change the locks to keep out excluded abusers.
Second, there are also laws that permit those persons subjected
to abuse to leave and identify a new home if they wish to do so: (1)
CPO laws that permit courts to order respondent to provide to
petitioner an alternative home (or the money for a new home); (2)
rental laws that permit a person subjected to abuse to terminate her
lease early so she can obtain a new home; and (3) anti-discrimination
laws that protect a person subjected to abuse from discrimination in
trying to obtain a new home (that may be rented or purchased)
because she is a victim of domestic violence; and (4) laws funding
domestic violence shelters and transitional housing.
Third, the CPO’s remedy of a “no further abuse” order is the
only civil law that specifically aids a person subjected to abuse who
wants to end the violence but stay in the shared home with the
person who caused the abuse.
B. Petitioner Chooses to Stay in Home and Exclude Respondent
As discussed above, the first category of laws are those that
permit a person subjected to abuse to stay in the shared home and
exclude the abuser. Where they exist, these laws provide support for
dignity and the option for an individual subjected to abuse to keep
her home and address the domestic violence. Her ability to choose
to maintain the home and exclude the person perpetrating the abuse
from it, however, varies by jurisdiction.
1. CPO’s vacate provision, eviction defense and lock-change laws
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have CPO statutes. 74
Protective orders can offer immediate, short-term, and longer-term
74. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1131; see generally Klein & Orloff, supra note 7.
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relief. 75 The short-term relief is usually in the form of an emergency
protective order (EPO) 76 or a temporary protective order (TPO) 77
and can be granted after an ex-parte hearing. An EPO might last
until the next business day and a TPO might last until notice is
provided to the respondent and both parties appear at the final
protective order hearing. The longer-term relief is in the form of a
final CPO. Some states’ CPOs last only six months and others can be
permanent. 78 In this Article, I conducted a fifty-one jurisdiction
survey (all fifty states and the District of Columbia) in order to
explore the real property allocation permitted under CPO statutes.
The CPO real property reallocation orders are often called “vacate”
orders as they provide the petitioner the right to vacate, or exclude,
the respondent from petitioner’s home during the length of the
order. 79 How the respondent is excluded, which respondents may be
excluded, and from what types of homes the respondent may be
excluded varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as
discussed below.
The second set of laws that permit the person subjected to abuse
to stay in the home and exclude her abusive partner are those laws
that permit a woman subjected to abuse to defend against a
landlord’s eviction claim. In most residential leases, tenants breach
the lease if a crime is committed on the premises. When there is
domestic violence, landlords often evict not only the abusive tenant
for a breach of lease but also the victim of violence. 80 To remedy this
unfair situation, eleven jurisdictions permit a tenant who is a victim

75. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1130.
76. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4–504.1(a), (b) (West 2012) (authorizing
court commissioner to issue an Interim Protective Order (Maryland’s EPO equivalent) ex parte
when court clerk’s office is closed).
77. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4–505(a) (West 2012) (authorizing court to
issue a Temporary Protective Order ex parte).
78. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b–15(d) (West 2012) (protective orders may last
up to one year, and can be extended if court deems an extension necessary) and MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 4–506(k)(3) (West 2012) (permitting permanent FPO in certain
circumstances). In Maryland, however, a permanent order may not include a vacate order. MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4–506(k)(2) (West 2012).
79. See e.g. ALA. CODE § 30–5–7(b)(7) (West 2012) (permitting court to remove and
exclude respondent from home) and MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4–506(d)(4) (West 2012)
(permitting court to vacate respondent from home under certain circumstances).
80. Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against Victims of
Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 377, 385 (2006).
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of violence to defend against such an eviction. 81 Five states permit
the lease to be bifurcated so that only the abusive person is evicted
and a new lease is created with the remaining tenant, the woman
subjected to abuse. 82 Similarly, under the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA), public housing agencies or Section 8 landlords cannot
evict individuals or terminate their assistance based on incidents of
actual or threatened domestic violence against them 83 or based on
criminal activity directly relating to such violence, 84 unless the
landlord demonstrates that the individual’s continued tenancy would
pose an “actual and imminent threat” to other persons on the
property. 85 Section 8 landlords also are given the power to bifurcate
a joint lease in order to evict the individual causing violence but
retain the tenant who is the victim of domestic violence. 86 In
addition, as with other VAWA housing provisions, landlords must
provide individuals with notice of these VAWA rights. 87
The third set of laws are the lock-change laws for renters. Ten
states have laws that permit the tenant to change the locks on her
apartment because of domestic violence and out of a concern that
the abuser would have keys to old locks to the apartment. 88 This

81. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38–42–402 (2011); D.C. CODE § 42–3505.01
(LexisNexis
2012); IOWA CODE §§ 562A.27A, 562B.25A(3) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:506(D)
(2012); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8–5A–05 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. § 504B.205
(2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47–8–33(J) (LexisNexis 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.449 (2011);
VA. CODE ANN. § 55–248.31(D) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.580 (LexisNexis
2012); WIS. STAT. § 106.50 (2012); See also Anne C. Johnson, From House to Home: Creating
A Right to Early Lease Termination for Domestic Violence Victims, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1859,
1882, 1885 (2006).
82. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-112(c)(3)(A)-(B) (2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 32–31–9–
14 (West 2007); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 227–c(2)(C)(II)(B) (McKinney 2012); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 90.456 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. § 704.16–19 (2008); NAT’L LAW CTR.,
THERE’S NO PLACE LIKE HOME: STATE LAWS THAT PROTECT HOUSING RIGHTS FOR
SURVIVORS
OF
DOMESTIC
AND
SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
(2012)
available
at
http://www.nlchp.org/Theres_No_Place_Like_Home.
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(c)(5), 1437f(c)(9)(B) (2006).
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(k)(6), 1437f(c)(9)(C)(i) (2006).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(c)(3), 1437d(c)(5), 1437d(l)(6), 1437f(c)(9)(B),
1437f(c)(9)(C)(i)–(ii) (2006).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(l)(6), 1437f(c)(9)(C)(ii) (2006).
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(u)(2)(B), 1437f(ee)(2)(B) (2006).
88. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33–1318 (LexisNexis 2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18–16–112
(2009); D.C. CODE § 42–3505.08 (LexisNexis 2001); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 750 / 20
(West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 32–31–9–10 (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §
8–5A-06 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42–42.3 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.459 (2011);
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provision provides extra security to a tenant who has vacated the
respondent from the home. The state laws protect the landlords
from possible claims of unlawful lock outs of the abusive tenant
as well.
2. Benefits
These three sets of laws—CPO vacate provisions, eviction
defense laws, and lock-change laws—provide a number of benefits to
victims of abuse. In terms of the goal of ending domestic violence,
the civil protection order’s vacate provision, when granted, does
permit petitioner and respondent to be physically separated and thus
creates a physical barrier to further physical abuse. This is also true of
the lock-change provision, which requires landlords to change the
locks to provide extra assurance that the respondent cannot re-enter
the rented home. As stated above, research shows that when women
choose the option of obtaining a CPO to address the domestic
violence and successfully obtain one, their exposure to violence
decreases. 89 As to the goal of maintaining a home, the eviction
defense laws preclude the landlord from evicting the person
subjected to abuse from her home while evicting the abuser. In
addition, the laws providing for bifurcation of the lease permit a
tenant to create a sole tenancy while the landlord evicts the
abusive partner.
In terms of the value of dignity and the home, these laws permit
the person subjected to abuse to stay in the shared home and create
a place of development and expression of her individuality to support
her dignity. She can stay in her community, which is where she is
most likely connected to schools, employment, neighbors, and
friends, and avoid the disruption of having to find a new place. In
addition, if she chooses to end the relationship, the vacate order
separating the parties respects her decision about rearranging her
relationship with the respondent. And being able to stay in the
shared home has the promise of keeping her from being homeless.
There are some advantages for the respondent as well. Seventeen
jurisdictions recognize respondent’s property interests and limit the
courts’ ability to vacate respondents if the home is solely-owned by
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57–22–5.1 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 55–248.18:1 (2012);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.585 (LexisNexis 2012).
89. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
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respondent. These jurisdictions often require that the respondent
have a family obligation to the woman or their children in order for
the court to vacate him from his solely-owned property. 90
3. Shortcomings
Despite these benefits, there are many shortcomings both for the
woman subjected to abuse and the perpetrator of the abuse.
First, a petitioner may be unable to persuade a court to order
respondent to vacate the home. The research shows that courts grant
vacate orders at a low rate. Thirty-four out of fifty-one jurisdictions
permit the court to exclude the respondent and/or grant possession
of the residence to the petitioner, regardless of the title to the
home. 91 Yet courts’ concerns over the breadth of this property rights
redistribution remedy may result in their reluctance to grant it.
Moreover, if a woman has fled the home initially but then seeks to
return to the home through the protective order, the court may

90. ALA. CODE § 30–5–7(c)(4) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. §19–13–4(a) (West 2012);
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19–A, § 4007 (2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93–21–15 (2008); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 173–B:4 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (West 2011); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20–4–60 (2012); and TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 83.006 (West 2011). Married: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60–3107 (West 2012); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4–506 (West 2012) (also cohabitant of at least 90 days in last year);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.050 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.718 (West 2012); WIS.
STAT. § 813.12(3) (2012) (or if not married, vacate for reasonable time only). Limited time:
ARIZ. R. PROT. ORD. P., Rule 6 (Arizona 2012), WIS. STAT. § 813.12(3)(a)(2)(am)(2012);
Marital Property: D.C. R. DOM. VIOLENCE, Rule 11 (2012). Duty to Support and Petitioner
has custody of children: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (2012).
91. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9–15–205 (2012); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 6321 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18–1–1001 (2012); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b–15(c) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(3) (West 2012);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. §19–13–4(a) (West 2012); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 586–4(a)(3), 586–5.5 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39–6306 (West
2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60 / 214 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 34–26–5–9
(West 2012); IOWA CODE § 236.5 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750 (West 2012);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950
(West 2012); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40–15–204 (2011);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030 (West 2011); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:25–29 (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40–13–5 (2012); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW §
842 (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14–
07.1–08 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.3 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §
15–15–3 (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25–10–5 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B–7–
106 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1–279.1
(2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060 (LexisNexis 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48–
27–403 (West 2012); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35–21–105 (2012).
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refuse to vacate the respondent who had stayed in the home. 92 In a
recent study of 80 plaintiffs who requested respondents vacate the
residence, the judges granted the request only six percent of the
time. 93 An earlier study showed that instead of vacating the
respondent, judges told over seventy percent of petitioners to
leave the home. 94 In another earlier study of 175 cases in
Kentucky, three judges granted orders to vacate 25% of the
time. 95 And another multi-state study showed that 32.4% of
protection orders granted a permanent order to vacate the
residence. 96 These studies show that in many jurisdictions, a
petitioner cannot rely on the court to issue a vacate order.
The defense of eviction and lock-change laws are also a
limited option for women subjected to abuse because the vast
majority of jurisdictions do not have these laws. Only eleven
jurisdictions have eviction defense and lock-change laws to
protect private tenants. 97 Therefore, women subjected to abuse
92. See email on file with author (petitioner counsel stating that this issue has risen
multiple times in his jurisdiction). But see Swenson v. Swenson, 490 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992) (reversing court’s refusal to vacate abuser from home). Also, a few
jurisdictions’ laws specifically permit a petitioner to vacate a respondent even if the petitioner
has left the home because of the abuse. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25–10–9 (2012); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36–3–613 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1–253.4(F) (2012).
93. Valli Kalei Kanuha & Martha L. Ross, The Use of Temporary Restraining
Orders (TROs) as a Strategy to Address Intimate Partner Violence, 19 V IOLENCE &
VICTIMS 343, 349 (2004).
94. Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases:
An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 T EX . J. WOMEN & L.
163, 195–96 (1993). It is important to note that this study and others from the 1990s
represent court decisions that pre-date more recent efforts to educate judges regarding
the dynamics of domestic violence.
95. Janet Ford et al., Case Outcomes in Domestic Violence Court: Influence of
Judges, 77 P SYCHOL . REP . 587, 590–92 (1995).
96. SUSAN L. K EILITZ , P AULA L. HANNAFORD & HILLERY S. E FKEMAN , CIVIL
P ROTECTION O RDERS : THE B ENEFITS AND L IMITATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF D OMESTIC
VIOLENCE 65 (1997). The authors also note that the District of Columbia and Denver
were more likely to grant such relief. Id. at 13, 29.
97. The eviction defense statutes are the following: COLO. REV. STAT. § 38–12–402
(2011); D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01 (LexisNexis 2013); IOWA CODE §§ 562A.27A,
562B.25A(3) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:506(D) (2013); MD. CODE ANN., REAL
PROP. § 8–5A–05 (2013); MINN. STAT. § 504B.205 (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47–8–33(J)
(2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.449 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 55–248.31(D) (2013); WASH.
REV. CODE§ 59.18.580 (2013); WIS. STAT. § 106.50 (2012). The states with bifurcation laws
are Arkansas, Indiana, New York, Oregon and Wisconsin.
The lock-change laws are the following: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33–1318 (2007); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 18–16–112 (2012); D.C. CODE § 42–3505.08 (LexisNexis 2013); 765 ILL.
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may also lose their apartments once rented, due to lease termination
provisions that are triggered when violence or crimes occur on the
premises. Moreover, landlords may attempt to evict women
subjected to abuse along with the violent party in order to avoid
creating a new lease with only the woman’s name, especially if she
suffers from credit and financial issues. 98 Public housing tenants and
tenants using Section 8 vouchers are provided eviction protection
under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). 99
For private tenants subjected to domestic violence, some
states require landlords to change the locks if requested by the
tenants. However, the tenants are required to bear the cost of the
lock-change. 100 Whether or not the landlords are required to
change the locks, only eighteen jurisdictions explicitly provide
tenants’ reimbursement for the lock-change under their crime
victims’ compensation funds. 101

COMP. STAT. 750 / 20 (2007); IND. CODE § 32–31–9–10 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., Real
Prop. § 8–5A–06 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42–42.3 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.459
(2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57–22-5.1 (LexisNexis 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 55–248.18:1
(2013); WASH. REV. CODE§ 59.18.585 (2004).
98. Lapidus, supra note 80, at 385.
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f(c)(9)(B), (d)(1)(B), (o)(7)(C), (o)(20) (2006) (these
provisions offer protection from eviction). Id. §§ 1437d(l)(6)(B), f(o)(7)(D) (these laws offer
bifurcation of the lease).
100. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33–1318 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18–16–112 (2012);
D.C. CODE § 42–3505.08 (LexisNexis 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42–42.3 (2013); OR. REV.
STAT. § 90.459 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57–22–5.1 (LexisNexis 2013); WASH. REV.
CODE § 59.18.585 (2012). Some states explicitly allow landlords to charge fees. 765 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 750 / 20 (2007); MD. CODE ANN., Real Prop. § 8–5A–06 (West 2010); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55–248.18:1 (2013).
101. ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.010 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16–90–706 (2012); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-4.1–101 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9006 (2013); D.C. CODE § 4–
507 (2013); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45 / 10.1 (2013); IOWA CODE § 915.86 (2011); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 258C, § 3 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 611A.57 (1993); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99–
41–5 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 217.090 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B–9 (West 2007);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B–7 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M–7–511 (West 2013); VT. STAT.
tit. 13, § 5356 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2–368.11:1 (2013). See also Compensation,
ALASKA DEP’T OF ADMIN., http://doa.alaska.gov/vccb/Victims/compensation.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2013); Crime Victim Compensation Program, DENVER DIST. ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE,
http://www.denverda.org/DA_Programs/victim_info/victim_compensation.htm
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013); Compensation Program, DEL. VICTIMS’ COMP. ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM, http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/VCAP/compensation.htm (last visited Nov.
7, 2013); Crime Victim Compensation: Frequently Asked Questions, OFFICE OF THE ILL.
ATTORNEY GEN., http://www.ag.state.il.us/victims/CV_FAQ_0113.pdf (last visited Nov. 7,
2013);
Emergency
Fund,
MINN.
DEP’T
OF
PUB.
SAFETY,
https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ojp/help-for-crime-victims/Pages/emergency-fund.aspx (last
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Another shortcoming of CPO vacate laws is that even if a
petitioner can get a CPO against the respondent that limits
respondent’s access to the home, many of the laws do not permit
the court to deprive respondent of all of his property rights during
the life of the CPO. 102 The respondent may use his remaining
rights in the property to continue to use the home to abuse
petitioner. Some states provide for the respondent to be excluded
or vacated from the home, thereby removing the respondent’s
possessory interests, but do not explicitly provide for the court to
order him to stay away from the home. 103 Some jurisdictions only
permit the court to order respondent to stay away from the home
and do not also allow the court to remove his right to possession or
even require that he vacate himself and his belongings. 104 The
problem with these inconsistencies is that it is possible that the laws
would still permit respondent access to the home, or at least the
ability to use the home, to perpetrate some abuse of and control
over petitioner. Either result would not further the goal of ending
domestic violence through the woman’s control of her home. For
example, if the law does not provide petitioner with exclusive
possession of the home, respondent will maintain the possessory
rights he had prior to the CPO. If he was ordered to stay away only
and there was no grant of exclusive possession to petitioner, while
respondent could not enter the premises and take possession due to
visited Nov. 7, 2013); Application for Victim of Crime Compensation, STATE OF NEV. VICTIMS
CRIME
PROGRAM,
http://voc.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/vocnvgov/content/VOC/
VOCP_Application-English.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2013); Benefits in a Nutshell, N.J. OFFICE
OF ATTORNEY GEN., http://www.nj.gov/oag/njvictims/benefits.html (last visited Nov. 7,
2013);
How
much
can
be
paid?,
N.C.
DEP’T
OF
PUB.
SAFETY,
https://www.nccrimecontrol.org/Index2.cfm?a=000003,002144,000016,000162,000166
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013); SUPERIOR COURT OF THE D.C., supra note 44; Are You a Victim
of
a
Crime,
UTAH
OFFICE
FOR
VICTIMS
OF
CRIME,
http://www.crimevictim.state.ut.us/Documents/Crime%20Victim%20Information/CrimeVic
timBrochure_2011.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
102. See infra notes 103–04.
103. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9–15–205 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18–1–1001
(2013); FLA. STAT. § 741.30 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60–3107 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 209A, § 3 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B–3 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14–07.1-02
(2013); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15–15–3 (2013); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25–10–5 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36–3–606 (2013).
104. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18–1–1001 (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 586–
4(a)(3), -5.5 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
600.2950 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.050 (2012); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney
2013); W. VA. CODE § 48–27–503 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 813.12(4)(a) (2012).
OF
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the stay away, he could transfer his possessory rights to another. 105
With his possessory rights, respondent could continue his exercise
of power and control by creating an involuntary roommate for
the woman.
The third disadvantage is that states do not offer adequate
options for a woman to economically maintain the shared home if
she chooses to exclude her abuser. Only New Jersey and Missouri
provide specifically for respondent to pay his share of the rent or the
mortgage for the home once he is vacated. 106 It is possible that
courts could order respondent to pay rent, the mortgage, or other
household expenses under a “catch-all” remedy, but such a remedy is
not available in every jurisdiction. 107 In addition, only two states
restrain the respondent from cancelling utilities during the life of the
CPO, 108 and only three jurisdictions preclude the parties from
transferring, encumbering, or disposing of the home during the life
of the CPO. 109 Accordingly, if a woman is able to successfully vacate
the respondent, in most cases, petitioner is left to pay for the
mortgage, rent, and the household expenses with only her one
income, if she even has that, and this may make the living situation
untenable for her.
Yet, even if petitioner is awarded the vacate order, awarded the
lock-change, and/or defended against eviction, physically excluding
respondent from the home is not always the solution to ending the
domestic violence. In fact, the separation itself can increase the
violence. 110 Research has shown that for certain women, separation
may heighten the violence. 111 For instance, one study showed that
“‘wives are much more likely to be slain by their husbands when

105. This situation happened in a recent Georgetown University Law Center clinic case.
It should be noted that in a few jurisdictions, the law specifically permits the court to order
respondent not to transfer the property. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60 (2012); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 83.006 (West 2013); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-403 (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
35-21-105 (2013).
106. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.050 (2012).
107. Klein & Orloff, supra note 7, at 912.
108. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60–3107 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1–279.1 (2013).
109. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20–4–60 (2012); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 83.006 (West 2013);
W. VA. CODE § 48–27–403 (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35–21–105 (2013).
110. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1127–28 (citing LENORE E. A. WALKER, ABUSED
WOMEN AND SURVIVOR THERAPY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST 55
(1994)).
111. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 97–98.
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separated from them than when co-residing.’” 112 Options beyond
physical separation need to be created to more thoroughly address
the societal epidemic of domestic violence. 113
For the respondents, the CPO vacate provision, eviction defense,
and lock-change laws have many shortcomings as well. Several
shortcomings reflect the dissonance between vacate orders and
property law. These CPO vacate provisions and lock-change laws
infringe upon a respondent’s property rights. And because a
respondent can be vacated from his solely-owned property in thirtyfour jurisdictions, even if not married to the petitioner, the law may
seem unjust from the perspective of the property holder.
In fact, as discussed in more detail below, this seeming injustice
can also negatively impact petitioners as well, as it can reduce the
chance that respondent will comply with the CPO. In addition,
legislators have shown reluctance to expand relief under civil
protection orders because of their perception that vacate provisions
are unjust. 114
Previously, respondents have been unsuccessful in arguing that
the vacate orders are an unconstitutional taking without just
compensation. 115 Because the vacate order does not disturb the
respondent’s title and is temporary in nature, courts have, to date,
found the vacate order constitutional. 116 As discussed earlier, thirtyfour jurisdictions permit the petitioner to exclude the respondent in
some manner from the home even if the petitioner is not on the

112. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: Separation Violence
as a Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women¸ 59 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 349 (2009)
(citing Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Spousal Homicide Risk and Estrangement, 8 VIOLENCE
& VICTIMS 3, 8 (1993)).
113. Id. at 348–49. In the United States, more than three women a day are murdered by
an intimate partner, and nearly one in four women will experience violence by a partner in her
life. See Get the Facts: The Facts on Domestic, Dating and Sexual Violence, FUTURES WITHOUT
VIOLENCE, www.futureswithoutviolence.org/content/action_center/detail/754 (last visited
Nov. 7, 2013); Domestic Violence: Statistics and Facts, SAFE HORIZON,
http://www.safehorizon.org/index/what-we-do-2/domestic-violence-abuse-53/domesticviolence-the-facts-195.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
114. This is based on the author’s own personal observations of legislative hearings on
CPO laws.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (applicable to states).
116. See State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 236 (Mo. 1982); Boyle v.
Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C. 3d 767, 773 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
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deed or lease. 117 This means that respondent could lose the right to
possess, occupy, include, or exclude persons from the home during
the period he is vacated without any compensation. While it remains
true that most jurisdictions’ CPO vacate provisions last for a limited
time, it is also true that in some jurisdictions the CPO is longer. For
instance, in New Jersey the CPO permits courts to enter permanent
orders of exclusive possession to the plaintiff, regardless of ownership
interests in the home. 118 Although the New Jersey statute also makes
clear, as do twelve other jurisdictions, that the CPO has no effect on
the title to the home, a permanent CPO with exclusive possession
granted to plaintiff means respondent cannot exercise many of the
rights of property ownership for the life of the CPO, which may be
equal to petitioner’s life. Therefore, petitioner could exclusively
possess the respondent’s home for the petitioner’s life. Because
permanent CPOs have not been challenged under the due process
arguments made to short-term TPO and CPO laws, it is a question
of whether such permanent deprivation of many of the indicia of
property ownership would no longer constitute a taking. 119
The laws in the other seventeen jurisdictions permit a vacate
order when respondent is the sole owner only under circumstances
where respondent is in a familial relationship with petitioner, such as
a spouse or parent of a child-in-common. Those laws seem less
unjust to respondent because they fit into the existing legal
landscape of marital property and family law’s duty of spousal or
child support. 120

117. See supra note 91.
118. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2013).
119. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982)
(finding a taking, requiring just compensation, when a permanent physical occupation of an
owner’s property is authorized by the government).
120. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 375 (2001);
KATHARINE K. BAKER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, FAMILY LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 91 (2009);
RANDY FRANCES KANDEL, FAMILY LAW: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS 38 (2000). In
addition to the duty of support, each spouse owes the other a duty of services as well. Id. See
also Judd v. Meszaroz, 2011 WL 4489049, at *7–8 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2011)
(explaining that the statute has restrictions on vacating property, such that it can only be
granted if the respondent has a duty to support the petitioner or other household members,
and that the ruling does not impact title); Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 775 A.2d
1249, 1257–58 (Md. 2001) (explaining that to grant a vacate order, judges must consider
“factors set forth in § 4-506(e),” which provides “a certain balance” between “protection of
persons who have been subjected to abuse” and “plac[ing] some limits on the right to the
relief allowed”).
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A second shortcoming of vacate laws for respondents is they do
not fit well with common law property principles of co-ownership.
In property law, when there are co-owners, they have an equal right
to possess the property. 121 If one co-owner excludes the other coowner, she could commit an ouster that would require the
possessing co-owner to pay rent to the out-of-possession coowner. 122 If there is an ouster, the occupying co-owner owes rent to
the excluded co-owner. 123 Ouster law anticipates only back rent or
re-entry and possession of the ousted party as the remedy. 124 Ouster
law does not recognize excluding from possession the ousting party.
Under the vacate laws, the petitioner has a court order effectively
ousting the respondent, but the order does not alter respondents’
rent or mortgage obligations, and the order does not require
petitioner to pay respondent back rent.
A third shortcoming of vacate laws is that courts can grant a
mere cohabitant—someone without a legal, familial relationship to
the respondent—a vacate order against a respondent. For example,
in Maryland, if the petitioner has been cohabitating with the
respondent in his solely-owned home for at least ninety days, she can
vacate respondent from his home through the CPO. 125 This is starkly
different from property law, which in general does not recognize
property rights of possession, use, or inclusion for cohabitating,
unmarried non-titled possessors of property. An exception is that in a
few jurisdictions, when a long-standing couple shares a home owned
by one of them where the title-holder had promised to convey joint

121. SINGER, supra note 120, at 348; see generally Gabay v. Bender, 823 N.Y.S.2d 389,
390 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (“Any co-owner of real property has the right to enter upon the
common estate and take possession of the whole thereof, subject only to the equal right of coowners in interest with whose possession he or she may not interfere.”); Pettus v. Atchafalaya
Wildlife Protective Soc’y., 351 So. 2d 790, 793 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (“The right of a co-owner
to use and possess property held in common is equal to that of other co-owners.”).
122. SINGER, supra note 120, at 351. As explained by Singer, “An ouster can be
accomplished only by such conduct as is sufficient both to exclude the non-occupying
tenant(s) and to communicate to them an intent to do so. Mere occupation of property by one
of several owners is not sufficient to communicate an intent to oust the others.” Id. It is
important to note that certain states codified laws that prohibited one spouse ousting another
spouse. See SUK, supra note 40, at 21–25.
123. SINGER, supra note 120.
124. Id.
125. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 4–501(d)–(m) (LexisNexis 2013).
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title, but had not, the non-owner does acquire an ownership
interests in the home at the end of the relationship. 126
As a result of dissonance between property and vacate laws,
respondents and courts, among others, often view the civil protective
order legal system as lacking fairness when it permits respondent to
be vacated from his home that is solely-owned and non-marital
property. The Bisnath case cited at the beginning of this Article
demonstrates this principle. There, the court found that respondent
had abused petitioner and granted all of the relief in the petition
except the request for a vacate order. The court stated, “Where is he
going to live?” 127
As Professor Deborah Epstein has explained, the social
psychology of authority shows that “[t]he likelihood of a person’s
compliance with . . . court orders . . . is at least as firmly rooted in his
perception of fair process as in his satisfaction with the ultimate
result.” 128 According to Epstein, a fair system “enhances a person’s
sense that authorities are moral and legitimate. This perception
facilitates a person’s sense of self-worth and, in turn, his degree of
compliance, even when this conflicts with immediate self-interest.” 129
Criminological theory about dignity supports this procedural justice
theory. Specifically, Epstein cites that “John Braithwaite’s shaming
theory holds that sanctions imposed in a manner that harms a
person’s dignity may result in an increase in future offending.
Conversely, sanctions imposed in a respectful manner that honors
human dignity may increase compliance with authority.” 130
Under Professor Tom Tyler’s theory of procedural justice, there
are four factors that contribute to judgments that a process, such as a
court proceeding, is fair: (1) “opportunities for participation

126. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 111 (Cal. 1976); W. States Constr., Inc. v.
Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Nev. 1992); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 906
(N.J. 1979) (citing positively to Marvin); McKechnie v. Berg, 667 N.W.2d 628, 631–33
(N.D. 2003); see also Sullivan v. Rooney, 533 N.E.2d 1372, 1373–74 (Mass. 1989) (creating a
constructive trust in order to avoid unjust enrichment to the promisor); Porter v. Zuromski, 6
A.3d 372 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (distributing cohabiters’ property based on unjust
enrichment).
127. Jennifer McMenamin, Judge’s Action Question Again, BALTIMORE SUN (Oct. 22,
2008),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2008-10-22/news/0810210094_1_domesticviolence-judge-lamdin.
128. Epstein, supra note 14, at 1846.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1877.
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(voice),” (2) “the neutrality of the forum,” (3) “the trustworthiness
of the authorities,” and (4) “the degree to which people receive
treatment with dignity and respect.” 131 A study of police interactions
with men who had committed domestic violence found that if they
felt they were fairly treated during their interaction with the police
the men complied with the law in the future. The study also found
that perceptions of fairness were more important for future
compliance than any police punishment (such as arrest or fines). 132
A respondent may view the CPO legal system as lacking fairness
when it permits him to be vacated from his home that is solelyowned, non-marital property. In those jurisdictions where the court
provides no opportunity to explain one’s attachment to the home,
whether one has alternative living arrangements if vacated from the
home, or other important and relevant facts, the court does not
provide respondent a voice in shaping the outcome of the vacate
order, and the respondent could perceive that he is not being treated
with dignity and respect. As a result, a respondent may feel that the
process is not fair and he will not comply with the resulting order.
The value of ending domestic violence may be undermined by
respondents’ noncompliance in the long-term.
A fourth shortcoming is that if a vacate order is granted, the
respondents are left looking for a new home. And yet there are no
shelters for men who abuse in the United States. Interestingly, there
is a shelter for abusive men in Israel called Beit Noam. 133 It is a livein treatment center for abusive men that has good results in reducing
future violence. 134 Beit Noam boasts a zero recidivist rate of
domestic abuse, as compared to the twenty-five percent rate for
batterer intervention programs in the United States, none of which
may be properly classified as shelters. 135

131. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND
SOCIETY 435, 445 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004).
132. Id. at 440 (citing Paternoster, Brame, Bachman, and Sherman, 1997).
133. Lora Bex Lempert, Shelters: For Abused Women, or Abusive Men? As Aids to Survival,
or as Rehabilitation Sites?, 57 AGENDA 89, 98 (2003); Ophra Keynan et al., Beit Noam:
Residential Program for Violent Men, 7 J. AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA 207,
208–09 (2003).
134. Lempert, supra note 128, at 98; Keynan et al., supra note 128, at 234 (showing
reductions in physical violence in short-term but needing long-range study to determine
effectiveness in long-term).
135. Lempert, supra note 128, at 98; Keynan et al., supra note 128, at 233. See also Eric
S. Makowski et al., Collateral Damage: An Analysis of the Achievements and Unintended
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Due to this lack of shelters for men who abuse, a perpetrator of
domestic violence may be separated from the person whom he had
abused, but his now-unstable living situation may nonetheless
negatively affect his former partner and any children. He may be
reliant on his community to support his new home or he may be
forced to rely on the homeless shelter system, which is underfunded
and under-resourced. 136 If the couple has children in common, the
lack of a more permanent home may make it difficult for the father
to maintain his involvement in the children’s life, through custody or
visitation. 137 The lack of a home also may create obstacles to
maintaining employment, which in turn may affect financial support
of the children and maintenance of the shared home and
household expenses. 138
A potential disadvantage of the eviction defense laws for persons
who perpetrate domestic abuse is that those laws often do not permit
a bifurcation of the lease, in which the evicted perpetrator would be

Consequences of Batterer Intervention Programs and Discourse, 17 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 167
(2002).
136. See Holly S. Schindler & Rebekah L. Coley, A Qualitative Study of Homeless Fathers:
Exploring Parenting and Gender Role Transitions, 56 FAM. REL. 40, 41, 48–49 (2007)
(explaining various strains that homeless fathers face).
137. See Rebecca Licavoli Adams, California Eviction Protections for Victims of Domestic
Violence: Additional Protections or Additional Problems?, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J.
1, 15, 22 (2012) (explaining that “financial abuse is a common type of domestic violence so
victims may also have trouble securing housing,” and even when housing is secured, women
and children may be evicted when the father shows up for visitation); Shirley Darby Howell,
Domestic Violence, Flawed Interpretations of 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(l)(6), Sexual Harassment in
Public Housing, and Municipal Violations of the Eighth Amendment: Making Women Homeless
and Keeping Them Homeless, 13 T.G. JONES L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2008) (explaining that at least
“fifty percent of homeless women became homeless as a direct result of domestic abuse,” many
of whom have children and now live on the streets).
138. Anne R. Roschelle, Welfare Indignities: Homeless Women, Domestic Violence, and
Welfare Reform in San Francisco, 25 GENDER ISSUES 193, 194, 202 (2008) (explaining that
abusive men “sabotage women’s training and employment responsibilities;” barriers to
employment are exacerbated by the exigencies of homelessness, especially for “homeless
women who are also victims of domestic violence” for whom “barriers can become
insurmountable”); Stephanie Riger, Sheela Raja & Jennifer Camacho, The Radiating Impact of
Intimate Partner Violence, 17 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 184, 200 (2002) (“Women with
children who do not have family support or access to affordable child care may find it
particularly difficult to establish themselves financially and vocationally.”); Pamela H.
Zappardino & Deborah DeBare, In Search of Safety: Double Jeopardy for Battered Women, 8
NEW ENG. J. OF PUB. POL., 753, 757 (1992) (“Child custody issues inevitably complicate the
situation for a battered woman who has left her home.”).
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removed from the lease and attendant obligations. 139 If the lease is
not bifurcated, but the perpetrator of abuse is evicted from the
rented home while the victim of the abuse remains, the perpetrator
may continue to be liable for any default by the possessing victim,
such as rent or damage to the property.
C. Petitioner Chooses to Leave Home and Respondent Stays in Home
There are four sets of laws addressing the scenario in which a
woman subjected to abuse chooses to leave the shared home to look
for a new home, while the respondent remains.
1. CPO alternative housing provision, early lease termination, antidiscrimination, and shelter and transitional housing funding laws
Under certain CPO laws, the court may order a respondent to
provide petitioner with new housing as an alternative to staying in
the shared home. 140 In addition, certain rental laws permit persons
subjected to abuse to terminate their lease early without penalty to
allow them to move away from their abuser. 141 Anti-discrimination
laws protect domestic violence victims who are seeking to rent an
apartment or purchase a home with a mortgage. 142 And finally,
139. See NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, THERE’S NO PLACE
LIKE HOME: STATE LAWS THAT PROTECT HOUSING RIGHTS FOR SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 33, http://www.nlchp.org/Theres_No_Place_Like_Home (last
visited 11/1/2013).
140. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60 / 214 (West 2012); IOWA CODE § 236.5 (2012);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 19–13–4(a) (2012); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93–21–15 (2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40–13–5 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B–3
(2012); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36–3–606
(West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1–279.1 (2012); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35–21–105
(2012).
141. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33–1318 (LexisNexis 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38–12–
402(2) (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5314 (2012); D.C. CODE § 42–3505.07
(LexisNexis 2012); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 750 / 15 (LexisNexis 2012); IND. CODE
ANN. § 32–31–9–12 (LexisNexis 2012); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8–5A–02
(LexisNexis 2012); MINN. STAT. § 504B–205 (2007); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 227–c
(Consol. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42–45.1 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.453 (2011); TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (LexisNexis
2012); and WIS. STAT. § 704.16 (2012). See also Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §
14043e–1 (2012).
142. LEGAL MOMENTUM, STATE LAW GUIDE: HOUSING PROTECTIONS FOR VICTIMS OF
DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND STALKING
(2010),
available at
http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/pdfs/housing-1.pdf (identifying eight jurisdictions
and Westchester County, NY as having anti-discrimination laws protecting domestic violence
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various funding laws for shelters and transitional housing assist
women subjected to abuse with limited economic means to
nonetheless find a new temporary home. 143
A woman subjected to abuse may seek a new home to create her
personhood interest, develop her personal identity, or form strong
community bonds. Sometimes a woman seeks a new home not
because she wants to leave the shared home but because under the
laws of her jurisdiction or as a result of the high rate of denial of a
vacate request she was unable to exclude the respondent from the
shared home. 144 If she was denied a vacate order, but wants to
victims). It is important to note that under the Federal Fair Housing Act, landlords, sellers of
real estate, and mortgagees are unable to discriminate on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C. §§ 36013606. Discrimination against women subjected to domestic violence can be illegal sex
discrimination when even neutral housing policies have a disproportionate effect on women.
Lapidus, supra note 80, at 380 (citing Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., ex rel.
Alvera v. C.B.M. Group Inc., HUD ALJ No. 10-99-0538-8 (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
Dev., Portland, Or., Apr. 16, 2001)). Ms. Alvera’s landlord gave Ms. Alvera 24-hour notice of
eviction because she had been assaulted by her husband. The eviction was based on the
landlord’s policy of evicting “‘tenants who pose a threat to the safety and well-being of other
tenants in the complex. When one person in the household poses a threat, the entire
household is evicted.’” Id. at 379 (citing Alvera v. Creekside Village Apts., HUD ALJ No. 1099-0538-8 (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Portland, Or., Oct. 22, 1999)). Under the
Fair Housing Law, landlords cannot reject rental applications because an applicant has
experienced domestic violence in the past, cannot enforce any rules against tenants
experiencing domestic violence that do not apply to other tenants, and cannot evict domestic
violence victims on account of domestic violence. Meris L. Bergquist, Esq., After the Violence:
Using Fair Housing Laws to Keep Women and Children Safe at Home, 34-SPG VT. B.J. 46
(2008); AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, KNOW YOUR HOUSING RIGHTS: FOR SURVIVORS OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/know-yourhousing-rights-survivors-domestic-violence; AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, THE RIGHTS OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS IN PUBLIC AND SUBSIDIZED HOUSING (2008), available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/womensrights/subsidized_housing_2008.pdf.
143. For FY2011, President Obama requested $649.36 million for violence against
women programs. Twenty-five million dollars were for Transitional Housing Assistance grants
through the Department of Justice and $140 million were for Family Violence
Prevention/Grants for Battered Women’s Shelters administered by HHS. GARRINE P. LANEY,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT: HISTORY AND
FEDERAL FUNDING 2 (2010). The Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, P.L. 10836, and the PROTECT Act, P.L. 108–21, also authorized funds for HHS and DOJ
transitional housing assistance programs for victims of domestic violence. Id. For FY2011
funding, the President requested $25 million for DOJ’s transitional housing assistance
program. Id. at 4. The 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $210 million for
STOP grants, which included $18 million for transitional housing assistance grants. Id. at
CRS-14 n.b. The Transitional Housing for Victims of Domestic Violence authorization,
administered by HHS, expired after FY2008. This HHS program never received
appropriations. Id. at CRS-15 n.j.
144. See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text.
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separate, then she must find a new home. Of course, there are
reasons why a woman may prefer this option, for example if she feels
that it is the best option for her in regards to her safety or other
issues. She may want a home with an address unknown to
respondent. An early lease termination law, for example, would
permit the tenant to break her lease and move, undetected by her
former abusive partner, to a new undisclosed location.
2. Benefits
There are several important benefits to these laws. All of these
laws facilitate the agency of a person subjected to abuse by offering
short-term alternative homes. As noted earlier, buttressing a
woman’s agency can result in decreased violence. 145 Moreover,
physical separation may decrease violence, although the research also
shows that separation can have the opposite effect in
certain circumstances.
These laws remove barriers to obtaining long-term homes. For
example, anti-discrimination laws generally prevent landlords from
rejecting rental applicants on the basis that the potential tenant was a
petitioner in a CPO case, even if the landlord fears that such
applicants may enter into violent relationships in the future and that
violence would disrupt other tenants. 146 These laws also protect
domestic violence victims, who, as applicants for mortgages,
sometimes are seen as risky debtors and unlikely to repay mortgage
loans. These laws prohibit mortgagees from refusing to loan money
because the applicant was or is a victim of domestic violence.
Accordingly, laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of
experience with domestic violence support women’s efforts to move
to a new home. These anti-discrimination laws recognize the dignity
of persons and refuse to let it be overshadowed by an individual’s
subjugation to intimate partner violence.
Laws that assist victims who seek new homes also benefit
respondents. If a victim of violence is able to find a new home, the
respondent is more likely to be able to remain in the shared home,

145. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
146. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14043 (2012). In addition, eight states
have specific fair housing acts protecting victims of domestic violence. See LEGAL MOMENTUM,
supra note 142 (identifying eight jurisdictions and Westchester County, NY, as having antidiscrimination laws protecting domestic violence victims); Lapidus, supra note 80, at 384.
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with the attendant benefits of maintaining his place of identity
development and connection to his community. In addition, a very
tangible benefit is that he will not be homeless provided he can
afford maintaining the home.
3. Shortcomings
The laws addressing women subjected to violence seeking a new
home have not been a panacea, however. In the main, too few
jurisdictions provide for alternative housing in the CPO laws, early
lease termination, or protection from discrimination. Under the
CPO laws, only eleven states specifically require the respondent to
provide alternative housing. 147 Often, this option is available only if
the respondent has a duty to support the petitioner or their children,
and the shared home is solely owned by respondent. 148 The
alternative housing option under the CPO demonstrates Lorna Fox’s
position that too often the home is based on a woman’s familial
relationships rather than her own identity and needs. 149 Only two
states specifically require respondent to pay rent for petitioner’s
alternative housing. 150 Accordingly, the limited availability of the
alternative housing option undermines supporting a woman’s dignity
to answer for herself the meaning of her life through development of
her home.
For tenants in federally-funded housing, there are more options
for alternative housing, and they are not linked to women’s familial
relationships. Under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), the
federal government supports the choice of a tenant who resides in a
federally-funded public housing unit or receives federally-funded
housing assistance, such as Section 8 vouchers, who decides to
transfer or seek reassignment to a different unit if she was subjected

147. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60 / 214 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. §19–13–4(a)
(West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (2012); IOWA CODE § 236.5 (2012); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 93-21-15 (2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40–13–5 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
50B–3 (2012); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36–3–
606 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1–279.1 (2012); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35–21–105
(2012).
148. E.g. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (West 2012).
149. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 46 (discussing Fox’s theory that the individual
female homeowner is invisible and the family as home occupier is highly visible).
150. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25–29 (West 2012) and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-403
(West 2012).
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to domestic violence. 151 If she is a private tenant, however, only
fourteen jurisdictions permit her to terminate her lease early because
of domestic violence. 152 If she is able to terminate her lease early, she
may have difficulty finding a new home. Prospective private
landlords may refuse to rent to her in order to avoid any future
domestic violence on the premises. Such discrimination is possible in
most jurisdictions as only eight jurisdictions have anti-discrimination
laws. 153 Under VAWA, public housing authorities and Section 8
landlords cannot deny admission to housing or use of her voucher
because she is a victim of domestic violence. 154
Women subjected to abuse may have difficulty identifying a new
home because of the effects of the abuse to which they were
subjected. Victims of domestic violence often are isolated from
family, friends, and support networks. 155 The isolation can result
from intentional actions by the abuser or from the woman’s efforts
to protect herself. As Professor Adele Morrison states, “Secrecy,
silence and shame are also aspects of the abuse itself. Abusers use
shame and secrecy as tools to control those they are victimizing.” 156
Professor Beverly Balos has discussed how this resulting isolation is a

151. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r)(5) (2012). VAWA does not exempt the tenant from liability
to her Section 8 landlord. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has issued
policy guidance urging public housing agencies to ensure that tenants are transferred when
needed because of domestic violence. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK §§ 19.2, 19.4 (2003).
152. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33–1318 (LexisNexis 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38–12–
402(2) (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5314 (2012); D.C. CODE § 42–3505.07
(LexisNexis 2012); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 750 / 15 (LexisNexis 2012); IND. CODE
ANN. § 32–31–9–12 (LexisNexis 2012); MD. CODE ANN., Real Prop. § 8-5A-02 (LexisNexis
2012); MINN. STAT. § 504B–205 (2007); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 227–c (Consol. 2012);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42–45.1 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.453 (2011); TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 92.016 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (LexisNexis 2012); and
WIS. STAT. § 704.16 (2012).
153. See D.C. CODE §§ 2–1401.01–.03 (2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 32–31–9–12 (West
2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42–45.1 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.456, .459
(West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34–37–1 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.580 (West
2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1201 (West 2009). LEGAL MOMENTUM, supra note 142
(identifying eight jurisdictions and Westchester County, NY as having anti-discrimination laws
protecting domestic violence victims).
154. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d, 1437f (2012).
155. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1119–1121.
156. Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence (Dis)course: Moving from White
Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1061, 1087 (2006).
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barrier to women subjected to abuse who want to leave the home. 157
A woman isolated from family and friends may have difficulty
requesting temporary shelter or financial support. Moreover, if
isolated from the broader community, the woman may have
difficulty knowing what resources might exist for her, such as
temporary shelter, money for moving expenses, and access to
transitional housing. Professor Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol
explains that “Latinas who suffer domestic violence are less likely
than other women to contact friends, family, or clergy. The result is
complete isolation that prevents Latinas from escaping abuse and
receiving help.” 158
Even if the woman is successful in finding a new home, moving
to a new home away from the community may exacerbate her
isolation. For example, many shelters are placed in confidential
locations and thus can dislocate the woman from her community. 159
Even if separated from her abuser and living in a new home or
shelter, isolation can increase a woman’s risk of violence. As
Professors Epstein and Goodman explain, “research shows that
women in hidden locations are no safer during their stay than
women in open shelters where community members can participate
in keeping residents safe.” 160
In addition, women cannot benefit fully from existing laws,
which permit or encourage them to leave a home shared with a
violent partner, because women continue to have insufficient
economic resources to leave the home. One study showed that for
African American women, “economic dependence on her husband”

157. Beverly Balos, A Man’s Home is his Castle: How the Law Shelters Domestic Violence
and Sexual Harassment, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 77, 99 (2004).
158. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Las Olvidadas-Gendered in Justice/Gendered
Injustice: Latinas, Fronteras and the Law, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 354, 385 (1998)
(footnote omitted).
159. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 102 (citing Haaken and Yragui 2003
study); SCHECHTER, supra note 44, at 59 (1982) (One Puerto Rican advocate stated “‘Puerto
Rican women who come to the shelter are very scared. They don’t want to leave their
community and come to a new place. They may have language problems. They don’t drive.
They may never have paid bills or done a budget. They particularly dislike having to share
rooms with other people, both black and white women. They have never lived this way before.
They’re not used to living collectively or sharing apartments like white women do.’”)
160. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 102 (citing Haaken and Yragui 2003
study).
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was the primary factor causing a return to an abuser. 161 Even after
extricating herself from lease obligations in the shared home, and
even with protection from housing discrimination, for example, a
woman who has been abused, like other potential tenants, still needs
money to actually leave due to moving expenses, first and last
months’ rents, down-payment on mortgage, deposits for utilities,
etc. Unlike many other tenants, however, a woman seeking a new
home because of abuse may have little time to obtain these necessary
funds. 162 If she finds temporary shelter upon leaving the shared
home, she may have only the length of a shelter stay, often as little as
fourteen days, 163 to accumulate sufficient resources; if she is unable
to locate emergency shelter, she may need the funds immediately.
For those women who live in one of the twenty jurisdictions that
have crime victims’ compensation fund monies that provide explicitly
for relocation expenses, she may be able to access those funds. 164

161. Cris M. Sullivan & Maureen H. Rumptz, Adjustment and Needs of AfricanAmerican Women Who Utilized a Domestic Violence Shelter, 9 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 275,
276 (1994).
162. Id. (“For women who use shelters, however, limited resources often trap them with
their assailants.”).
163. See, e.g., Martin Donohoe, Homelessness in the United States: History, Epidemiology,
(July
7,
2004),
Health
Issues,
Women,
and
Public
Policy,
MEDSCAPE,
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/481800 (“Average length of stay at a US shelter is 14
days; most allow a 30-day maximum stay.”).
164. Alabama (moving expenses, security deposits and utilities): ALA. CODE § 15–23–15
(1998); ALA. CRIME VICTIMS’ COMP. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT (2011), available at
http://www.acvcc.state.al.us/downloads/annualreport2011.pdf; California (relocation): CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 13957 (West 2010); Victim Comp. and Gov’t Claims Bd., What’s Covered,
CA.GOV, http://www.vcgcb.ca.gov/victims/coverage.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2013);
Delaware (temporary housing, relocation expenses, mortgage and rent payments): DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 9006 (West 2009); Del. Victims’ Comp. Assistance Program, Compensation
Program, http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/VCAP/compensation.htm (last visited Nov.
6, 2013); District of Columbia (temporary shelter, first month’s rent and moving expenses):
D.C. CODE § 4-507 (2000); SUPER. CT. OF THE DIST. OF COLUM., supra note 44; Florida
(relocation expenses): FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.198 (West 2012); Illinois (relocation, including
temporary lodging, rent, security deposit and moving van and storage): ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 740 § 45 / 10.1 (West 2013); OFFICE OF THE ILL. ATT’Y GEN., CRIME VICTIM
COMPENSATION:
FREQUENTLY
ASKED
QUESTIONS,
available
at
http://www.ag.state.il.us/victims/CV_FAQ_0113.pdf; Indiana (shelter expenses): IND.
CODE ANN. § 5–2-6.1–21 (West 2009); Kansas (moving expenses): KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74–
7305 (West 2011); CRIME VICTIMS COMP. BD., ANNUAL REPORT, available at
http://ag.ks.gov/docs/documents/crime-victims-compensation-board-annual-report2012.pdf?sfvrsn=6; Maryland (rent, utility bills or relocation expenses): MD. CODE. ANN.,
Crim. Proc. § 11–810 (West 2004); CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD, DEP’T OF
PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, (2003), available at
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Unfortunately, those monies do not exist in the majority
of jurisdictions.
Many victims of physical, psychological, or emotional abuse are
also subjected to various forms of economic abuse, potentially
exacerbating the financial crisis in which a woman may find herself
when seeking a new home. Financial abuse may include actions by
the abuser that damage the woman’s credit rating, sabotage her
employment, require her to turn over any income earned to her
partner, or exclude her from access to family monies. 165 As a result of
the abuse, the petitioner’s work, credit, and financial records may be
poor. Therefore, landlords and mortgage companies may refuse to
rent or loan money to her for housing. 166
But access to short-term housing options, such as shelters 167 and
transitional housing, 168 are not just limited by a woman’s economic
http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/publicinfo/publications/pdfs/CICB2004AnnRpt.pdf;
Mississippi (relocation and temporary housing assistance): Miss. Code. Ann. § 99–41–5 (West
2012); Nevada (shelter and relocation costs): NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.090 (West 1991);
Dep’t of Admin., Victims of Crime, VOCP Benefits and Covered Expenses, NV.GOV,
http://voc.nv.gov/VOC/Covered_Expenses/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2013); New Hampshire
(relocation expenses): N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21–M:8–h (2013); ST. OF N.H. VICTIMS’
COMP. PROGRAM, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARE YOU A VICTIM OF CRIME, available at
http://doj.nh.gov/grants-management/victims-compensationprogram/documents/brochure.pdf; New Jersey (moving expenses, first month’s rent, security
deposit, temporary shelter): N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B–9 (West 2007); Victims of Crime
Comp. Office, Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, Eligibility Requirements, NJ.GOV,
http://www.nj.gov/oag/njvictims/eligibility.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2013); New York
(shelter and moving expenses): N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 525.12 (McKinney 2011); Office of Victim
Servs., Compensation, NY.GOV, http://www.ovs.ny.gov/services/VictimCompensation.aspx
(last visited Nov. 6, 2013); Pennsylvania (relocation expenses): 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 11.103
(West 2005); Tennessee (moving expenses, storage fees and utility transfer fees): TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29–13–106(a)(7) (West 2012); Texas (one-time relocation expenses, including rent,
utilities, moving expenses): TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.42 (West 2003); Utah
(relocation expenses): UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M–7–511 (West 2011); UTAH OFFICE FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIME: CRIME VICTIM REPARATIONS PROGRAM, ARE YOU A VICTIM OF A
CRIME,
available
at
http://www.crimevictim.state
.ut.us/Documents/Crime%20Victim%20Information/CrimeVictimBrochure_2011.pdf;
Vermont (rent, relocation and temporary living expenses): VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5356
(West 2008); VT. CTR. FOR CRIME VICTIM SERVS.: VICTIMS COMP. PROGRAM, HAS YOUR
LIFE
BEEN
AFFECTED
BY
CRIME?,
available
at
http://www.ccvs.state.vt.us/sites/default/files/resources/VCCVSAffected%20
by%20Crime.pdf; Virginia (reasonable moving expenses): VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2–368.11:1
(West 2008).
165. GOODMARK, supra note 26, at 42–43; Johnson, supra note 4, at 1115–24.
166. Lapidus, supra note 80, at 385.
167. For example, in Washington, D.C. there are ninety-six shelter beds that provide
twenty- to thirty-day stays on average. In addition, there is available emergency shelter in local

40

DO NOT DELETE

1

5/5/2014 3:42 PM

A Home with Dignity

means. Such housing options are also limited by the public funding
for them. Routinely, public funding is high for the criminal justice
response to domestic violence and much lower for housing. For
example, the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $189
million for STOP grants, 169 monies which fund the criminal justice
system’s response to domestic violence. 170 The STOP grants budget
has remained at the same level since 2010. 171 The Act provided only
$18 million for transitional housing assistance grants in 2010. 172

hotels for an average of three nights. The emergency shelter offered 375 adults and
approximately 700 children shelter in 2011. DC SAFE, Statistics, DCSAFE.ORG,
http://dcsafe.org/domestic-violence-info/statistics/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). Yet when
one compares the numbers of persons able to be served to the 5,401 persons seeking domestic
violence assistance by visiting the Domestic Violence Intake Center in Washington, D.C., it
becomes clear that the number of people sheltered is inadequate. DC SAFE, supra.
168. For example, DASH, a nonprofit focusing on safe housing in Washington, D.C., has
doubled the number of transitional housing units to 43. Dist. Alliance for Safe Housing,
Programs & Services, http://www.dashdc.org /programs-services/ (last visited Nov. 6,
2013). That still is far fewer units than needed for the large percentage of the 5401 persons
who visit the Domestic Violence Intake Center in DC and need housing. See DC SAFE, supra
note 167 and author’s personal experience with the clients her clinic students represent.
169. CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, FY 2013
APPROPRIATIONS
BRIEFING
BOOK
8
(2012),
available
at
http://www.nnedv.org/docs/Policy/FY_13_Briefing_Book.pdf (STOP grants for law
enforcement agencies and prosecutor offices).
170. Stoever, supra note 26, at 305 n.3 (stating that criminal justice response, and
especially encouraging arrest policies, were “by far the largest category” of STOP funding).
The Department of Justice explains that “the STOP Program promotes a coordinated,
multidisciplinary approach to enhancing advocacy and improving the criminal justice system’s
response to violent crimes against women. It encourages the development and improvement of
effective law enforcement and prosecution strategies to address violent crimes against women
and the development and improvement of advocacy and services in cases involving violent
crimes against women.” Office on Violence Against Women, US Dep’t of Justice, Grant
Programs, USDOJ.GOV http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/ovwgrantprograms.htm#17 (last visited
Nov. 6, 2013). As stated on the Michigan Department of Human Resources website, victim
service programs are allocated 30% of the STOP grants as opposed to the criminal justice
system, which received 50%. Specifically, the website states, “The federal STOP Violence
Against Women program requires communities to show how it will allocate at least 25% of the
grant to law enforcement, 25% to prosecution, 5% to courts, and 30% to victim services
programs. The remaining 15% may be spent in any way the group decides is appropriate, but it
must conform to the federal grant guidelines.” Mich. Dep’t of Human Servs., STOP Violence
Against Women Grants, MICHIGAN.GOV, http://www.michigan.gov/dhs/0,4562,7-1247119_7261_7272-15062 —,00.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
171. CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note
169, at 6.
172. Id. The Transitional Housing Assistance Program seeks to provide “holistic, victimcentered” support services that move individuals into permanent housing. Office on Violence
Against Women, supra note 170.
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While the allocation for transitional housing increased to 25 million
in 2012, 173 President Obama requested $3 million less for 2013
transitional housing funding. 174 The Family Violence Prevention and
Services Act, which provides money for domestic violence shelters
along with counseling and hotline services, provided $130 million in
2010. 175 President Obama’s proposed budget for FY 2013 is
$135 million. 176
Even with the funding provided, 177 local shelters and transitional
housing still turn away tens of thousands of persons subjected to
abuse each year. 178 In 2009, although able to serve over one million
victims of domestic violence, shelters denied 167,069 requests due
to lack of capacity. 179 Sixteen domestic violence shelters closed in
2009. 180 And in just one day in 2011, while 5,149 adults and 7,551
children were in transitional housing, 2,629 persons’ requests for
transitional housing were denied because of a lack of available
units. 181 Similarly, in just one day in 2011, 10,581 requests for

173. CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note
169, at 6.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 7.
176. Id.
177. It is important to note that there are other federal housing assistance programs such
as the Housing and Urban Development’s McKinney-Vento Supportive Housing Program,
state departments of social services, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. See Alyse
Faye Haugen, Comment, When it Rains it Pours: The Violence Against Women Act’s Failure to
Provide Shelter From the Storm of Domestic Violence, 14 SCHOLAR 1035, 1063 n.138 (2012).
178. Nat’l Coalition Against Domestic Violence, State Facts, NCADV.ORG
http://www.ncadv.org/resources/FactSheets.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). For instance,
“[i]n 2007, 8,324 men, women and children were turned away from shelters in Missouri
because they were full.” NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, MISSOURI
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS, available at http://www.ncadv.org/files/Missouri%202.09.pdf.
In addition, “[i]n 2006, 10,131 adults and 12,076 children were turned away from [New
York] shelters due to lack of space.” NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS: NEW YORK, available at http://www.ncadv.org/files/New
%20York%20new%202.09.pdf. In Colorado, the lack of affordable housing makes it difficult
for victims to transition from shelters to permanent residences and therefore, if possible,
victims request to extend their shelter times. NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE,
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
FACTS:
COLORADO,
available
at
http://www.ncadv.org/files/Colorado%20revised%202.09.pdf. See also Haugen, supra note
177, at 1057.
179. CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra
note169, at 20.
180. Id. at 5.
181. Id. at 20.
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shelter and other nonresidential services were denied because of a
lack of resources. 182
For those women able to enter the shelters, the maximum stay is
often thirty days. 183 Locating permanent housing can take six months
or longer, however. 184 Due to the shortage of alternative housing,
women who would otherwise reside apart from an abusive partner
often are unable to do so. 185
Even fewer options are available for men, transgendered
persons, 186 persons with disabilities, and women who have limited
English proficiency. 187 Shelters are not always able to accommodate
dietary, religious, or cultural differences. 188 Restrictions as to the
number and ages of children also serve as barriers to shelter entry for
women with large families. 189Women who suffer from mental illness
and substance abuse are often screened out at a shelter’s intake
as well. 190
182. Id. at 4.
183. Ashley Lowe & Sarah R. Prout, Economic Justice in Domestic Violence Litigation,
MICH. B.J., Sept. 2011, at 32, 33. The average stay is sixty days in an emergency homeless
shelter. CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note
169, at 20.
184. CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra
note169, at 20; Lowe & Prout, supra note 183, at 33.
185. CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note
169, at 20; Lowe & Prout, supra note 183, at 33.
186. See Goodmark, supra note 4.
187. Jessica H. Stein, Coalition, Cross-Cultural Lawyering, and Intersectionality:
Immigrant Identity as a Barrier to Effective Legal Counseling for Domestic Violence Victims, 11
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 133, 154 (2011) (“Issues with shelter, language, and food, for instance,
cause victims to return to their abusers even if they were able to leave initially.”); HernandezTruyol, supra note 158, at 385 (describing the barrier to Latinas in English-only policies,
which result from the absence of Spanish speaking staff).
188. See, e.g., Nooria Faizi, Domestic Violence in the Muslim Community, 10 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 209, 219 (2001) (explaining that Muslim women do not feel comfortable in
“western” shelters because of the cultural, religious and dietary differences); Felicia E. Franco,
Unconditional Safety for Conditional Immigrant Women, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 99,
125–26 (1996) (explaining the impact of cultural and religious differences on Asian and Latina
immigrants); Sharon Stapel, Falling to Pieces: New York State Civil Legal Remedies Available to
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Survivors of Domestic Violence, 52 N.Y. L. SCH. L.
REV. 247, 264 (2007–2008) (explaining that domestic violence shelters “often do not provide
appropriate services for LGBT survivors”); Stein, supra note 187, at 154.
189. Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 158, at 385 (identifying such policies as barriers to
Latinas who may have large families).
190. Louisa Gilbert, Mainstream Legal Responses to Domestic Violence vs. Real Needs of
Diverse Communities, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 13, 46 (2001) (“I do not know of one domestic
violence shelter in New York City that serves women who report current drug use.”); Hilary
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Another shortcoming to relying on shelters as a new home for
women subjected to abuse is that women find certain shelters
increasingly inhospitable, even hostile, environments. Initially,
shelters operated on empowerment-oriented, feminist models. 191 For
instance, shelters recognized domestic violence as systemic in nature,
and expressly provided domestic violence services within a larger
context of gender oppression. 192 As government funding became
available for shelters, however, funding requirements led shelters to
approach domestic violence as an individualized problem, rather than
a manifestation of shared, societal concerns. Today, shelters
increasingly focus on interventions and treatments for the women
staying in the shelter, such as requiring them to apply for
government benefits and substance abuse and therapeutic
counseling. 193 As Susan Schechter points out, shelter residents are
subjected often to onerous bureaucratic rules. 194 Shelters also
sometimes impose on mothers prescribed parenting practices, and
insist that women have no contact with their batterers. 195 These
requirements and restrictions may cause women to refrain from
entering shelters or to leave shelters abruptly.
Finally, another shortcoming to creating a new home at a shelter
is that the shelter stay itself does not necessarily stop the violence.
One study showed that ten weeks after a shelter stay, 46% of women
continued to experience domestic violence. 196

Mattis, California’s Survivors of Domestic Violence Employment Leave Act: The Twenty-Five
Employee Minimum Is Not A Good Rule of Thumb, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1319, 1326–27
(2010) (“Some domestic violence shelters also turn away particularly vulnerable women, such
as homeless women and women with drug or alcohol addiction.”).
191. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 93; SCHECHTER, supra note 44, at 63.
192. SCHECHTER, supra note 44.
193. EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL
LIFE 76 (2007) (citing a 1993 study finding that of 379 advocacy programs, the majority
“emphasized counseling, information, and referral, meeting immediate needs for clothing or
shelter, helping women get protection orders, and other direct services rather than systems
change, although many understood that structured change was a precondition for effective
help.”); KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRIATED
THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE 70–71 (2008).
194. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 93; SCHECHTER, supra note 44, at 63.
195. BUMILLER, supra note 193, at 131 (“Social workers acquired a mandate to eradicate
intimate violence through the treatment of victims rather than focusing on solutions that
would require changing the behavior of perpetrators.”).
196. Sullivan & Rumptz, supra note 161, at 281.
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D. Chooses to End Violence and Stay with Respondent in Home

For the petitioner who chooses to end the violence but stay with
her intimate partner in the home there are few legal remedies. The
paucity of options is a result of the legal system’s limited goal of
short-term safety through physical separation that was discussed
above. If an individual wishes to end the abuse but stay in her
relationship, all of the options focused on physical separation do not
meet her goal. Other choices are scarce. As a result, the legal system
has not created as many choices as possible to support an individual
in this position and thus support her dignity to have a shared home
and decrease domestic violence.
1. CPO no further abuse provision
CPO laws generally permit a petitioner to seek an order
enjoining the abuser from future abusive conduct without also
seeking an order directing the abuser to leave the home or refrain
from contact with the victim. 197 Accordingly, in most states, civil
protection order laws permit a person subjected to abuse to stay in
the shared home with the abusive partner, including while
continuing their relationship. In a few jurisdictions, however, the
CPO law does not permit a petitioner to seek a “no abuse” order
without ending her relationship with the partner who abused her. 198
2. Benefits
A woman subjected to abuse might choose to stay in the home
and continue her relationship with the person who abused her for a
wide range of reasons. 199 Attuned to her partner’s personality and
predilections, the person may believe that the violence will decrease
if the relationship continues. Some studies show that this does
happen. 200 The emotional connection she feels to her intimate
197. MD. CODE ANN., Family Law § 4–506 (West 2012).
198. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence:
Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487,
1504 n.110 (2008) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25–28.1 (establishing that no protection
order can be granted that would permit respondent to share the premises with petitioner));
Stoever, supra note 26, at 333.
199. Goldfarb, supra note 198, at 1520–21.
200. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 98 (showing that safety can increase while
continuing the relationship with person who had committed the abuse in the past).
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partner may be strong, despite the abuse, 201 or she may want the
family to stay united in one home if there are children. 202 She may be
concerned about her financial viability or the loss of community ties
if she separates. 203 Moreover, the person may be concerned that
violence will increase if she ends the relationship, leaves the home, or
forces the abusive partner to do so. 204 Similarly, she may be choosing
to avoid future psychological harm that would result from separation
violence. 205 Finally, as discussed above, women can be empowered
by tailoring a remedy to their own, individual situation. 206
3. Shortcomings
As discussed above, there is only one law that specifically permits
women to remain in a shared home with the abusive partner while
ending the violence. This “no further abuse” provision of CPO laws
does not, however, comprehensively address the needs presented by
the situation. For example, these CPO laws do not direct provision of
financial assistance to maintain the home or address the woman’s
economic or isolated situation, if present. And while no crime victims’
compensation law explicitly provides for rental or mortgage assistance
for a victim who does not relocate, one jurisdiction, West Virginia,
explicitly discourages payment of any monies that would benefit a
respondent if the victim continues to live with him. 207 CPO laws do
not also contain provisions that address a woman’s agency while in the

201. GOODMARK, supra note 26, at 96–101 (2012) (discussing love); Martha R.
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 17 (1989); Stoever, supra note 26, at 331–32.
202. Mahoney, supra note 201, at 17.
203. Id.
204. Stoever, supra note 26, at 332.
205. Id. (discussing that women who are abused may be staying in relationships that have
been abusive in order to avoid “future threats of violence, as well as the psychological
consequences of trauma, which include post-traumatic stress symptoms such as hyper-vigilance
and anxiety-producing flashbacks of the violence”) (citing SONDRA BURMAN, COGNITIVE
PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY AND STAGES OF CHANGE THAT FACILITATE AND SUSTAIN
BATTERED WOMEN’S LEAVING, IN BATTERED WOMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES 33, 44 (Albert
R. Roberts ed., 3d ed. 2007)).
206. Johnson, supra note 30, at 571.
207. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14–2A–1 (West 2012) (“The extent to which a payment to a
victim will support the offender by paying for the offender’s living expenses, including food,
shelter, clothing, or entertainment, or the extent to which the payment will substitute for
money that the offender otherwise normally would expend for the benefit of the household or
its members, so as to avoid unjust enrichment of the offender.”).
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home—such as explicitly protecting or supporting a woman’s agency
to maintain relationships with family and friends as well as to maintain
or seek employment.
The effectiveness of laws that permit women to remain in a shared
home with an abusive partner is hamstrung by the ambivalence of
system actors about the appropriateness of this remedy. Such
ambivalence undermines the dignity of women subjected to abuse as
well as men who have perpetrated abuse. As noted earlier, civil and
criminal justice system responses to domestic violence are premised on
physical separation as the key to safety. Thus, lawyers, judges,
courtroom clerks, and advocates may not inform women that this
option is available, or may discourage the choice 208 by berating or
verbalizing frustration with a woman’s choice to stay with her partner
who had abused her. 209 Judges sometimes disbelieve women who
testify that they were abused and who also seek to stay in a shared
home with the abuser, finding the desire to stay impossibly
irreconcilable with the experience of abuse. 210 As a result, persons
subjected to abuse may not actually be able to actualize their choice—
or may be reluctant to exercise it. Such undermining of agency and
dignity can actually increase women’s risk of future violence. 211
III. PROPOSAL: A HOME WITH DIGNITY EVEN AMIDST DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
As discussed above in Part II, obstacles in the current legal
landscape to owning or maintaining a home for women subjected to
abuse and men who abuse may increase domestic violence. These
obstacles are embedded in the current legal system’s narrow, illdefined goals, the actual laws themselves, and their attached
funding schemes.
A. Current Obstacles
First, an important obstacle to owning and maintaining a home
and ending domestic violence is the fact that the connection between
208. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 98.
209. Stoever, supra note 26, at 336–41.
210. Id. at 336.
211. See Gist, supra note 24; Tamara Kuennen, “No-Drop” Civil Protection Orders:
Exploring the Bounds of Judicial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 91–94 (2009).
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home control and ending domestic violence is underdeveloped. This
obstacle is explained in part by Lorna Fox’s theory of the invisibility
of women as single home owners and occupiers. As a result, women
subjected to abuse have a limited ability to maintain their home or
obtain a new home without being a spouse or having children with
her abuser. Contributing to this result is the low court rate of issuing
vacate orders against respondents, regardless of respondents’
ownership interests in the home. 212 Also, the limited number of
jurisdictions that offer exclusion and stay away from the home orders
against respondent while also granting petitioner exclusive possession
makes it difficult for women subjected to abuse to control their own
home. And because few jurisdictions provide lock-change rights,
eviction defense protection, CPO alternative housing options,
financial assistance for housing, and anti-discrimination laws there
are even fewer opportunities for women subjected to abuse to
maintain their own home. This obstacle can undermine petitioners’
dignity, such as their personal development, expression of their
individuality, their bodily health and integrity, their emotions, their
affiliation with others and their control over their environment. The
obstacle in maintaining their home or obtaining a new home also
thwarts women’s agency, further increasing their risk of violence.
Second, many laws that promote separation as the only option to
ending domestic violence. This obstacle is often grounded in a belief
that violence is short-term and can be stopped by establishing
physical barriers. This obstacle is also often bounded in a black and
white view of domestic violence—that it is either egregious or not
present and that a person subjected to domestic violence is either a
victim and lacks agency or is a survivor and demonstrates her agency
by leaving. The laws that promote separation rarely permit a woman
subjected to abuse to choose to stay in the relationship and home
but end the violence. As a result, the laws often undercut both
parties’ dignity by failing to respect their intimate associations and a
woman’s choice to control her environment.
Third, many jurisdictions vacate respondents from their solelyowned homes without consideration of their attachment to the
property or their alternative living arrangements. Moreover, there is
no system in place to provide alternative homes for men who are
abusive, such as shelters. As a result, the law does not support
212. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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respondents’ dignity as it does not consider respondents’ home and
how it interplays with respondents’ development and expression of
their individuality, their affiliation with their neighbors and
community members, and their control over their environment.
Most vacate remedies do not require more proof than the abuse
committed by respondent against an intimate partner in order to
exclude him from the home. As a result, the law does not provide
respondents a voice in the vacate process and respondents may view
this as unfair. Such unfairness can also result in diminished
compliance with protective orders and increased violence.
What we see from these obstacles is that the home is critical, the
choice of which home is critical, and the support for the home is
critical for dignity and overcoming the obstacles to ending domestic
violence. Therefore, I propose that our legal system reconceive how
best to create or maintain a home for both parties. The legal system
response to domestic violence could eradicate many of these
obstacles if it were guided by the value of supporting dignity, which
is integrally connected to having a home and ending
domestic violence.
B. Feminist Domestic Violence Movement Should Focus More on
Dignity and Greater Home Access
The feminist domestic violence movement could play an
important role in transforming the current legal system response to
domestic violence, which is currently focused on a narrow concept of
safety premised on physical separation in the home. The movement
could work towards improving domestic violence laws, policy, and
funding decisions to reflect a broader, comprehensive focus on
dignity. Focusing on the value of dignity could invigorate the
concept of home and promote the goal of ending domestic violence,
rather than merely containing or responding to its outbreaks of
violence. As discussed earlier in this Article, supporting dignity
includes supporting such human capacities as life; bodily health;
bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions;
practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over
one’s environment. 213

213. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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The first obstacle to the legal system ending domestic violence
identified above is that the legal system misunderstands the
connection between home control and ending domestic violence. As
seen in the case study of low-income Puerto Rican women,
maintaining their home or obtaining a new home was critical to the
cessation of domestic violence. 214 This is true even if the women
chose to stay in their relationships. 215 Susan Schechter aptly
identified the need for an expanded focus for the feminist domestic
violence movement to focus beyond domestic violence as individual
problems rather than collective ones and to connect battering to
“the larger struggle to free women from oppression . . . [and to]
other political struggles.” 216This expanded focus could include added
support for the dignity of women subjected to abuse. Accordingly,
the movement could highlight the importance of supporting
women’s dignity by expanding to more jurisdictions helpful laws
(such as vacate laws with exclusive possession to petitioner) and to
ensure that the law on the books (such as the CPO vacate law) is
actually effectuated in reality.
The second obstacle discussed above is the legal system’s heavy
focus on separation and short-term options for women subjected to
abuse. With a renewed focus on dignity, the feminist community
could explore the importance of the woman’s connection to and
relationship with her partner and her community and its ability to
support her, and thereby enrich the personhood stake in her home.
If dignity were the overriding value in domestic violence law and
policy, resources could be redistributed to provide more funding for
shelters, transitional housing, and alternative housing promoting a
stable home to balance out the heavy emphasis and funding of the
criminal justice system responses to domestic violence. The enlarged
focus would create a more nuanced meaning of safety, so that
separation and sole possession of the home would not be the only
ways to end domestic violence, and indeed could be recognized as
threatening safety in some circumstances. Focusing on dignity could
help ensure that shelter housing is not the end of the process for
finding a home, and instead expand the options for long-term home
options as well. And focusing on dignity would recognize and

214. See supra text accompanying note 75.
215. Id.
216. SCHECHTER, supra note 44, at 252.
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support the woman’s rationality, practical decision making,
emotions, and intimate associations, including decisions to stay in
the relationship and shared home and attempt to end the violence.
The third obstacle discussed above is that the legal system
unfairly undermines the dignity of men who abuse women. Rather
than exploring how best to allocate the home when there is domestic
violence, the vast majority of jurisdictions vacate a respondent
regardless of his sole-ownership of his home and without any inquiry
into his attachment to the home or his alternative housing options.
Once found to have committed abuse, most CPO laws permit a
vacate order without further proof. As a result, respondent is denied
a voice in the process of determining who shall have access to which
home. If the feminist domestic violence movement could focus more
on dignity—including the dignity of men who abuse—there could
be a focus on giving voice to the men. The focus on dignity will
further the goal of ending domestic violence. Under the theory of
procedural justice, if the legal system provides an opportunity for
each party to voice their concerns about an issue, there will be
greater compliance with the final order. In addition, given the
concerns courts have made regarding the lack of a voice for
respondents, if there is a chance for respondents to voice their
attachment to and need for a home, perhaps more courts will vacate
respondents when necessary because the courts will feel the system
is fairer.
C. Focused on Dignity, the Domestic Violence Movement May More
Effectively End Abuse in the Home
With a greater focus on dignity, the feminist domestic violence
movement may spawn effective reform to end domestic violence in
homes. As discussed above, our current legal system does not
adequately address both parties’ need for a home when there is
domestic violence. As a result, the goal of ending domestic violence
and each party’s dignity are undermined. Focusing on dignity, and
the connection between supporting human being’s capabilities,
advocates can argue for new laws that could address the right to a
home when there is domestic violence. Below are two ideas for legal
change to tackle the obstacles addressed in this Article.
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1. Expand criteria for home possession based on goals of ending domestic
violence, supporting dignity, and affirming the importance of home
One legislative proposal is to expand the criteria for determining
home possession. For CPO vacate laws, rather than considering
simply whether the petitioner or respondent should remain in the
home based on whether or not there was abuse, the law should use a
series of factors that would honor all of the competing values, such
as fairness, property interests, economic resources, community
connection, ending domestic violence, and the benefits of home. In
allocating property rights to shared homes, courts should weigh the
petitioner’s interest in ending domestic violence, the court’s finding
that respondent committed abuse against petitioner, the woman’s
agency, the property interests in the home held by each party, each
party’s personhood interest in the home, and each party’s connection
to and reliance upon the community in which the home is located.
In addition, the court could be ordered to consider the family
relationships that exist between the petitioner and respondent, as
well as whether there are any minor children. Finally, the court
should consider the economic resources held by each party, the
access to alternative housing for each party, and the duration of the
order that would exclude the party from the home. The vacate
provisions themselves should list all of these factors to be weighed,
and identify the guiding values of ending domestic violence,
supporting dignity, and affirming the importance of home.
Although four jurisdictions currently have a factor analysis built
into their property-allocation provision, the factors are more limited
than those proposed here. 217 In addition, these jurisdictions do not
provide any guidance for why the criteria were selected or how to
weigh the factors. 218 A textured analysis of these factors may avoid

217. ARIZ. R. PROTECTIVE ORDER PROC. R. 6 C.5.b; 750 ILCS 60/214 (b) (Ill.); MD.
CODE ANN., Fam. Law § 4–506(h); and NDCC, 14–07.1-08 (N.D.). Under MD. CODE
ANN., Family Law § 4-506(h) (2012), the factors are: “(1) the housing needs of any minor
child living in the home; (2) the duration of the relationship between the respondent and any
person eligible for relief; (3) title to the home; (4) pendency and type of criminal charges
against the respondent; (5) the history and severity of abuse in the relationship between the
respondent and any person eligible for relief; (6) the existence of alternative housing for the
respondent and any person eligible for relief; and (7) the financial resources of the respondent
and the person eligible for relief.”
218. PROTECTIVE ORDER R. 6 C.5.b; 750 ILCS 60 / 214 (b) (Ill.); § 4–506(h); and
NDCC, 14–07.1-08.
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court decisions, for example, that attempt to overcome the fairness
concern raised by vacating a respondent from solely-owned property
by weighing respondent’s property interests more heavily than
deserved given the respondent’s connection to the property.
2. Increase the number of home options based on goals of ending
domestic violence, supporting dignity, and affirming the importance of
home
Another legislative proposal consistent with a focus on dignity is
increasing the number of home options. For instance, vacate laws
should focus not only on which party will have exclusive or shared
possessory rights to the home, but also should ensure that such
decisions result in a suitable and stable home for each party. Neither
party should become homeless, lose contact with her or his
personhood property, or become dislocated from her or his
community. For instance, if respondent is able to maintain exclusive
possession of the shared residence after the CPO, the vacate laws
should provide a mechanism for petitioner to obtain funds from
respondent (if available) for alternative housing as a petitioner may
do in New Jersey and West Virginia or she should be provided an
alternative home, if the respondent can provide one, as is permitted
in ten jurisdictions. Similarly, if petitioner is granted exclusive
possessory rights over the home, the vacate laws should provide a
remedy of obtaining funds from the respondent to assist petitioner in
necessary household expenses, such as the rent, mortgage, utilities,
and real estate taxes, if he is able to afford it. In addition, all
jurisdictions should have early lease termination laws and antidiscrimination laws for domestic violence victims to make finding a
new home for the person subjected to abuse a real option.
In addition, private and public support for shelters and lowbarrier housing should be increased for persons subjected to abuse to
ensure that there are housing options beyond the shared home that
would not only support the agency, dignity, and safety of the
petitioner but also the respondent (by staying in the shared
residence) as well. For example, the Alaska public housing agency
recently began a new program that provides displaced victims of
domestic violence with thirty-six months of rental assistance. 219
219. ALASKA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 3 (2012),
available at http://www.ahfc.us/iceimages/rental/empowering_choice_housing_mou.pdf.
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Recently, there have been positive developments in lowering barriers
to shelters and transitional housing, 220 and these improvements
should continue to make this housing more accessible and livable for
persons subjected to abuse in a way that permits them to be
connected to the community and even their partner if they so wish.
Increased housing options also could preclude both parties from
becoming homeless as a result of the domestic violence.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the legal system does not appropriately address all of the
issues that are critical to supporting each party’s need for a home. As
a result of this deficit, domestic violence may be exacerbated, the
parties may become homeless, and the parties’ dignity is diminished.
This problem results from the legal system’s limited goals for the
system—achieving a narrow view of short-term safety premised on
physical separation in the home. I argue for creating a
comprehensive theory that addresses the rights to a home when
there is domestic violence by focusing on each party’s dignity, the
importance of home, and ending domestic violence. My proposal for
supporting the dignity of each party in these situations is to have the
feminist domestic violence movement focus more on dignity and
greater access to a home. The goal of this focus would be to
advocate for system change and new and expanded laws. Legislative
changes could include creating factors to guide the vacate decision
and to increase the number of housing options for both women
subjected to abuse and men who perpetrate abuse.

220. DIST. ALLIANCE FOR SAFE HOUS., supra note 168.
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